IREQ.

SETTLEMENT OF THE ASSYRIAN COMMUNITY IN IRAQ.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council, for information, a letter dated September 20th, 1933, from H.E. Moury Pasha al Said, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Iraq, referring to action taken as a result of the Council's resolution of December 15th, 1932, and accompanied by a document entitled "Correspondence relating to Assyrian Settlement from 13th July, 1932, to 5th August, 1933".


To the Secretary-General.

In my letter N° 4244 of 14th May, 1933 I had the honour to record, for the information of the Council, the preliminary steps taken by the Iraqi Government to implement the declaration made by its representative at the sixty-ninth session of the Council, pending arrival of the expert who was to assist in settling landless Assyrians.

2. I have now to inform you, with great regret, that

(x) A limited number of copies of this document only having been received, it is not possible to distribute more than one copy to each member of the Council.

(xx) See document C.332.1933.VI.
owing to the refusal of Mar Shimun to acquiesce in the Council's decision of 14th December, 1932, his organization of a mass emigration to Syria of even settled Assyrians, and the subsequent armed attack made by a large force of his followers on the Government troops, no further progress has been made. The circumstances are fully set forth in the accompanying Blue Book published by the Government.

3. In view of the manifest unwillingness for political reasons of a large number of the Assyrian immigrants, even those happily established on the land since twelve years, to settle down peaceably in Iraq, and in view of the recent bloodshed that has exacerbated intertribal animosities, my Government is forced to the conclusion that the whole Assyrian question will now require consideration de novo.

A further communication on this subject will be addressed to you in due course.

(Signed) Noury Said,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(x) The resolution referred to was adopted by the Council on December 15th, 1932; see Official Journal, 13th year, No 12, page 1964.
Prière de bien vouloir retourner ce document à la DISTRIBUTION (Chambre 6) après consultation.
Correspondence relating to

ASSYRIAN SETTLEMENT

from 13th July, 1932, to 5th August, 1933.

PART I

INTRODUCTORY NARRATIVE.

PART II

CORRESPONDENCE.

Note.—To reduce the work of translation of documents from Arabic in the short time available the reports of the British Administrative Inspectors at Mosul have been freely drawn upon to illustrate the course of events in the North.

Baghdad.
Printed at the Government Press.
933.
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ASSYRIAN SETTLEMENT.

PART I.

Introduction:—Narrative of Events 13th July, 1932, to 5th August, 1933.

1. Although the British Settlement Officer who carried out the greater part of the Assyrian Settlement left ’Iraq in 1928, the local authorities continued to allot vacant lands to such applicants as presented themselves from time to time. By 1932, apart from the Ashuti tribe, mostly shepherds with little or no desire to cultivate, only a very few Assyrian cultivators remained without land; a certain number of settlers however, finding their new villages malarial, desired to move if possible to more salubrious districts; also a number of the men to be discharged from the Levy Force, which had been maintained by the British Government and was to be reduced in strength, was expected to apply for land.

2. In July 1932, therefore, a Committee was formed to look for suitable land (1 and 2).* On August 9th, 1932, this Committee submitted the report annexed to the letter dated 30th November, 1932, from H.E. Nuri Pasha as Said which was communicated to the Council of the League of Nations on 2nd December, 1932. By February 1933 the vacant State lands had been inspected and classified and it was decided to form an Assyrian Advisory Committee to assist the Official Settlement Committee in the actual work of settling landless Assyrians. Nuri Pasha’s letter 4244 of 14th May, 1933, to the Secretary General of the League of Nations gave an account of progress to that date.

3. Mar Shimun was absent from Mosul, in connexion with his visit to Geneva, from 10th September, 1932, to 11th January, 1933. Even while the Assyrian petitions were sub judice there was already much loose talk among Mar Shimun’s supporters of seizing by force the Dohuk—Amadiya area claimed in the petitions, appeals to Russia, alliances with the Kurds, and like. Yaku and Luko were already prominent in this connexion (3, 4, 5). In the meantime Malik Khoshaba applied for settlement in the Dashtazi on behalf of his tribe, the Lower Tiyari, many of whom occupy the malarial district of Nahla, and of the landless Ashutis (6).

Mar Shimun reached Baghdad on 4th January, 1933, and, in an audience with H.M. King Faisal and in an interview with the Prime Minister, gave the impression that he was inclined to accept the decisions of the Council of the League of Nations (7). From the moment of his arrival in Mosul, however, it was clear that this was not the case. Mar Shimun openly voiced his sense of grievance against the British Government, branded as traitors those Assyrians who had applied for settlement or re-settlement, and set out in particular to wreck the proposals for a settlement in the Dashtazi (8—13, 15); there was also talk, with the object of rendering the Assyrians restless, of emigration to Persia, Syria or Turkey, (10). The Government continued to explore every possibility of convincing the Assyrians of its good-will (14, 24).

4. At the end of February efforts were made, by verbal persuasion and written invitations, to induce Mar Shimun to co-operate with the Assyrian Advisory Committee and to nominate members to serve on it; these efforts met with blank refusals (16—20, 22). The campaign of obstruction and intimidation of loyal Assyrians even by threats of excommunication and talk of emigration redoubled (23—27); Mar Shimun was giving instructions for specific acts of disobedience (28). Assyrians, who had registered their rifles in previous years as required by the law, now refused to do so. Yaku son of Malik Ismail was summoned to Dohuk Qadha headquarters on May 21st; he arrived with an armed escort and defied the Qaimmaqam (28-a).

* Numbers in brackets refer to the documents in part 2.
5. In view of the imminent arrival of the settlement expert Major Thomson, it was decided to summon Mar Shimun to Baghdad to receive an authoritative statement of the Government’s policy in executing the decision of the Council of the League of Nations and towards the Assyrians in general and the Mar Shimun himself, and also to make it clear that obstruction, which was now taking the form of disobedience under arms, could not be tolerated. This statement (29) was handed to Mar Shimun by the Minister of Interior personally on 31st May, 1933. Mar Shimun, after complaining to H.M. the King against the Government’s attitude (30), replied on June 5th in an insolently worded letter in which he appeared to be claiming unconstitutional temporal power (31). Both the Minister, and Sir K. Cornwallis, Adviser to the Ministry of Interior at the Minister’s request, endeavoured for many hours without success to persuade Mar Shimun to withdraw this letter and substitute a less objectionable document. Sir K. Cornwallis then recorded his conversation with Mar Shimun (32, 33, 36) and offered to ask the Minister to consider the matter closed if Mar Shimun would acknowledge a draft letter he had prepared (38) in a very simple formula (39). To this the Minister subsequently agreed; but Mar Shimun refused and sent counter-drafts both for the Minister’s letter and his own (40). The counterdraft was clearly unacceptable for several reasons: (i) it sought to introduce into paragraph 3 (a) a new declaration of policy not germane to the purpose of the correspondence; (ii) the reiteration of the Government’s refusal to delegate temporal power to Mar Shimun was cut out and replaced by a promise to maintain the “traditional and established customs” of his Assyrian people; (iii) the last paragraph was recast in a form throwing blame on Government officials and omitting all reference to non-cooperation by the Assyrians.

6. After the departure of Sir K. Cornwallis for Europe the Acting Adviser and, subsequently at the request of the Prime Minister, the Acting British Ambassador spent many hours with Mar Shimun endeavouring to persuade him to moderate his uncompromising attitude and to undo the harm done to himself and his cause by his first intemperate letter to the Minister; again without success. On 18th June the draft originally shown to Mar Shimun by Sir K. Cornwallis issued over the Minister’s signature (41).

7. Major Thomson, the settlement expert, had arrived in Baghdad early in June and also endeavoured to enlist Mar Shimun’s cooperation; Mar Shimun refused (33 and 34).

8. In the meantime Yaku son of Malik Ismail of the Upper Tiyari tribe continued his campaign of disobedience under arms (36, 37). On 14th June he came in with a large armed escort for an interview with Major Thomson, who very properly refused to see him in this defiant mood (42). By June 19th Yaku’s band was reported to have risen to 200; an attempt to waylay a party of loyal Assyrians by 100 of these led to threats of reprisals (44). Yaku was interviewed in turn by Rev. Mr. Panfil (an American missionary), the Qaim-maqam of Amadiya, and Major Sargon, the British Inspecting Officer of Police, and various minor officials, who endeavoured to persuade him to come in. His letters (one of which was endorsed, “Copy to Mar Shimun”) contained, among other demands as conditions precedent to his coming in, stipulations (i) that the police reinforcements sent to Dohuk should be withdrawn, (ii) that agreement must be reached between the Government and Mar Shimun on the manner of land settlement, (iii) that an Assyrian named Werda who was in prison in Dohuk should be released. Other Assyrians were refusing to come in and the general atmosphere of defiance of Government was unsettling the Kurds (45, 47, 48, 50). On June 24th the situation was so serious that it was decided to despatch a military force to Dohuk to prevent the spread of the disturbance; the size of the force was made larger than the actual circumstances might seem to have required in order to reduce the chances of resistance (49, 52, 54). At the last moment the Administrative Inspector, Mosul, was instructed to make a final effort to bring Yaku in, and so prevent the outbreak of fighting. This the Administrative Inspector successfully did; Yaku gave an undertaking to keep the peace in future and was pardoned (53, 55, 62); the loyal Assyrians protested against the clemency shown to Yaku (56, 57).
9. In view of his intransigent attitude and the outbreak of disorder at Dohuk the return of Mar Shimun to Mosul was by now clearly inadvisable; an intimation to this effect was conveyed to him by telephone and confirmed in writing on June 24th. On July 21st, the Ministry received two letters from Mar Shimun (59 and 61).

10. The second letter deserves some comment in that it brings out the fundamental difference in the attitude of Mar Shimun on the one hand and of the 'Iraqi Government and the League of Nations on the other towards the question of Assyrian Settlement. The 'Iraqi Government had accepted the liability of finding land in 'Iraq for the Assyrians because force of circumstances and the law had made them 'Iraqi nationals. Mar Shimun had not acquiesced in the decisions of the League of Nations and sought, either to force the 'Iraqi Government with the threat of ultimate resort to arms to make for them (or rather for himself) arrangements of the kind referred to in his petition to the League, or to force the League to find them a home elsewhere; no obligation of loyalty to the 'Iraqi Government was admitted until such time as his demands should have been met.

11. There being reason to believe, that Mar Shimun had concealed from his followers the results of his visit to Geneva and the decision of the Council of the League of Nations, steps were taken to summon the sectional chiefs of the Assyrians to Mosul to receive printed copies of the decision and explanations of Government policy. The explanations were received with enthusiasm by the loyal sections; the others promised to be obedient as long as they were in 'Iraq but intimated that they would wish to consult Mar Shimun as to whether they should stay in 'Iraq or leave (63).

12. Yaku and Luko, the leaders of the recalcitrant Assyrians, then promised to visit Baghdad to counsel moderation to Mar Shimun. Actually they left secretly for Syria with letters from Mar Shimun to the French mandatory authorities. Apparently without waiting to ensure that immigrants would be welcomed in Syria, they sent back messages that all was well. Immediately after the Mosul meeting talk of migration to Syria was heard. On July 20th large numbers of armed Assyrians began to collect in the hills (64 and 65). On 22nd they began to arrive at Faishkhabur on the Tigris and to cross into Syrian territory; by noon on 23rd some 1,200 men were reported to have crossed (67). Many villages were left without any able-bodied men; interrogation of the women showed that the men had been induced to leave by statements to the effect that Assyrians were about to be disarmed, at the Mosul meeting this alleged intention to disarm had been categorically denied but there had evidently been intensive propaganda among the simpler villagers (66). Returned Assyrians who have been interrogated are almost unanimous in stating that they left in obedience to orders from Mar Shimun and Yaku; many also state that among the inducements offered were alleged promises by the French authorities that they would be lodged, clothed and fed for five years, as they had been in the British refugee camp at Baquba.

13. The continuous movement of large bodies of armed men about the country-side could clearly no longer be tolerated unless Government was to abdicate its functions altogether. Military forces were sent to the Tigris with orders to allow Yaku's followers to re-cross the river only on condition that they surrendered their arms. In order to minimise the possibilities of a clash, a few small parties were allowed to cross from left to right after the arrival of the troops; but on July 27th, in consequence of objections by the French authorities, further crossings were forbidden. It was impressed on the military that every effort was to be made to avoid bloodshed (70, 71, 72, 73, 75). The agents of Mar Shimun continued to persuade other Assyrians to follow the earlier parties (67, 74).

14. In the meantime, on July 23rd and 27th, urgent representations were made to the French Legation in Baghdad requesting the immediate application of Articles 5 and 6 of the Provisional Agreement for the Regulation of the Affairs of Frontier Tribes in force, between the two countries (68, 76, 81, 90).
A meeting between 'Iraqi and French representatives took place on July 29th when the policy of the 'Iraqi Government was explained; the French representative on his part promised to disarm the Assyrians when the new boundary came into force, and in any case not to drive them back into 'Iraq by force.

15. On 31st July reports were received that the French authority had disarmed nearly all the members of Yaku's band. All danger of bloodshed now appeared to be past. On August 1st the 'Iraqi Government published a communiqué announcing that the French authorities in Syria had carried out their obligations under Articles 5 and 6 of the Provisional Agreement and that the movement of armed defiance was at an end (80, 84). Some of the tribesmen then began to negotiate for permission to return.

16. Another meeting between Captain Lariste and Makki Beg the 'Iraqi Political Officer was held, at the request of the former, on August 2nd. The French representative conveyed the impression that he would shortly disarm the Assyrians who still retained their arms—the number appeared to have risen to 350—before forcing them to return to 'Iraq; Makki Beg emphasised that if any question of returning their arms to the disarmed tribesmen should arise the 'Iraqi authorities should be given ample notice (86).

17. On the afternoon of August 4th the 'Iraqi Assistant Political Officer, Lazar Effendi, met a French Officer at Khanik in connexion with the handing over of the police post there; the demarcation of the new boundary having been completed on July 31st; no mention was made of any return of arms to the Assyrians. The rifles were suddenly returned later in the evening. Towards dusk the tribesmen began to cross the river, and attacked the small party sent to receive their arms. After midnight a violent attack developed against the camp of the 'Iraqi army and was not finally repulsed until several hours after sunrise. Casualties suffered by the Army in this action were: killed; 3 officers and 31 other ranks; wounded 41 other ranks (87, 88, 89).
ASSYRIAN SETTLEMENT.

PART II.

Correspondence.

NUMBER 1.

Secretary, Council of Ministers to Minister of Interior, No. 2838 dated 13th July, 1932, (Translation).

I am directed by H.E. the Prime Minister to request you to form a committee of Government Officials to enquire urgently into the existence of vacant miri lands for the Assyrians residing in 'Iraq, without ejecting anyone from his land.

NUMBER 2.

Ministry of Interior to Mutasarrif, Mosul, No. C/2489 dated 14th July, 1932, (Translation).

We forward herewith a copy of Secretary, Council of Ministers Memorandum No. 2838 dated 12th July, 1932, and have to inform you that we have decided a committee is to be formed under your presidency with Major Wilson, Administrative Inspector of your Liwa, the Qaimmaqam Dobuk, Makki Effendi al Sharbatchi, and the Station House Officer, Amadia Qadha, Rafael Yonan Effendi, as members.

This committee should assemble at Mosul very urgently and enquire whether there exist any vacant Government lands suitable for cultivation in Dohuk, Amadia, Aqra and Zakho Qadhas for the settlement of Assyrians thereon. After obtaining the necessary particulars from the Qaimmaqams of the said Qadhas and inspecting the lands on the spot when this is considered necessary, the committee, should submit a report to this Ministry during the first week of next month.

NUMBER 3.

Administrative Inspector, Mosul, to Adviser, Ministry of Interior, Baghdad, No. 862 dated 30th October, 1932.

There have been no startling developments in the Assyrian situation.

Mar Shimun is reported to have written asking for a further document in support of the Assyrian demands and various leaders have been in Mosul. It is not known whether any document has been produced.

There are still certain Assyrians who talk of taking a zone by force if such is not given them. Prominent amongst these are Rab Emma Gewergis Shabu and Rab Khamashi Odishu Nathan of the 'Iraq Levies, Mosul, who have been indulging in bellicose talk in Mosul recently.

If the Deshtazi scheme is sanctioned, I am strongly of opinion that the lower Tiyari and Ashuti sections should be given the first refusal of the area. These sections are virtually the only sections without land and they are moreover on the whole peaceably inclined towards the 'Iraq Government.

I imagine Mar Shimun would like to bring Malik Ismail and the Upper Tiyari from Rowanduz district.

Rumours are now current amongst the Assyrians in Mosul that if the League does not accede to the demands of Mar Shimun the latter will proceed to Russia.
NUMBER 4.
Administrative Inspector, Mosul, to Adviser, Ministry of Interior No. 8/865 dated 1st November, 1932, (Telegram).

It is reported that a secret meeting attended by Assyrian Bishops, Maliks and Levy Officers took place here last night.

I have no information as to the purport of discussions or decisions reached.

The sons of Malik Ismail are undoubtedly spreading very harmful propaganda which is dangerous.

NUMBER 5.
Commandant of Police, Mosul, to the Mutasarrif, Mosul, No. 1599/11 dated 4th November, 1932, (Translation).

On 1st November, 1932, I went to Dohuk and after having met the Qaimmaqam I found him to be also anxious to tour in the district in which, I understand, some of Mar Shimun's supporters have been touring. Therefore, we went together to Suwara-Tuka and on the 2nd and 3rd November, 1932, we visited a number of the Amadia and Dohuk villages among which were Kavlasin Gorogawan and Bageira villages. There we were interviewed by some of the Assyrian leaders and we have been able to understand that Yaku bin Malik Ismail has been for the last three days touring in those villages and must have spread there harmful propaganda not in the interest of law and order, and that Malik Luko of Tkhuma has gone to Amadia for the same purpose.

I could see nothing to show that there exists an effective movement at present, but what we have gathered from some Kurdish villages is that considerable propaganda is being spread by Assyrians and supporters of the Kurdish cause from beyond the frontier for an agreement to be reached between Assyrians and Kurds, even those outside the 'Iraq frontier, in order to gain a homeland for them and for the Kurds.

Actually, there is nothing to show that an agreement has been reached between the Kurds living within the area of this Liwa and Assyrians. But increasing effective measures for mutual understanding are required to make both simple and educated villagers understand the good intentions of Government and to assist the poor as well as those remaining homeless. As you know, mere promises will have no effect and will leave an opening for spreading propaganda quickly.

We have noticed that Assyrians have been going to Arbil area, such as Daud Effendi, father of Mar Shimun, who is trying to reach an understanding with Shaikh Bedi of the Surechi, being under the impression that most of the Surechi are his followers. The fact of Assyrian Officers and troops touring much during recent days is noteworthy.

I think that our tour in that district at this moment, following the tracks of the others, has had a good effect on the inhabitants and even on Assyrians, who realise that the Government is aware of propaganda. Some of them wished us to be their guests and actually invited us, in order to prove they have no connection with the movement we have discovered.

We have taken some measures to obtain information, and will report any fresh news from time to time.

NUMBER 6.
Administrative Inspector, Mosul, to Adviser, Ministry of Interior, No. 8/892 dated 22nd November, 1932, (Received 24th November, 1932).

Malik Khoshaba has now taken up his residence in Dohuk and discussions are taking place between him, the Qaimmaqam and Dr. Baba regarding the settlement of the Lower Tiyari in the Dashtazi.
Malik Khoshaba appears to favour the idea and is sounding his headmen on the subject.

The Mar Shimun party are attempting to prevent this settlement project by spreading propaganda to the effect that the Dashtazi area is malarial. This is certainly quite untrue and as Government intends to prohibit the cultivation of rice in that area, there is no reason why it should become malarial.

If the Lower Tiyari agree to settle in the Dashtazi, I would suggest that Malik Khoshaba be appointed as in charge of settlement and be given an allowance while doing so.

The Qaimmaqam Dohuk is submitting certain proposals on which I will comment in due course.

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NUMBER 7.
Communicated to the Council. C. 837. 1932. VI.

Geneva, December, 14th, 1932.

IRAQ.

PETITIONS FROM THE ASSYRIAN COMMUNITY.

Draft Resolution presented by the Committee constituted by the decision of the Council of December 5th, 1932.

"The Council,

In conformity with the proposal submitted by the Committee, charged, by its decision of the 5th December, 1932, to prepare a draft resolution regarding the question of the Assyrian community of ‘Iraq in the light of the report of the Permanent Mandates Commission of the 14th November, 1932:

Adopts the view of the Permanent Mandates Commission that the demand of the Assyrians for administrative autonomy within ‘Iraq cannot be accepted;

Notes with satisfaction the declaration by the Representative of ‘Iraq of the intention of the ‘Iraqi Government to select from outside ‘Iraq a foreign expert to assist them for a limited period in the settlement of all landless inhabitants of ‘Iraq including Assyrians and in the carrying out of their scheme for the settlement of the Assyrians of ‘Iraq under suitable conditions and, so far as may be possible, in homogeneous units, it being understood that the existing rights of the present population shall not be prejudiced;

Feels confident that if these measures do not provide a complete solution of the problem, and there remain Assyrians unwilling or unable to settle in ‘Iraq, the ‘Iraqi Government will take all such measures as may be possible to facilitate the settlement of the said Assyrians elsewhere;

Requests the ‘Iraqi Government to be so good as to keep it informed in due course of the results of the foregoing measures”.

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NUMBER 8.


I doubt if the attitude of Mar Shimun is entirely satisfactory.

He did not visit the Mutasarrif until four or five days after his return to Mosul on January, 11th.

He has not visited the, Administrative Inspector at all and has openly stated that if the British had not opposed his claims at Geneva all the other powers were prepared to grant them in full; and in this and other ways he is attempting to create an anti-British feeling amongst his people.
Malik Khoshaba, who in Mosul recently went to call on Mar Shimun but was refused admission, and Mar Shimun stated that he would have nothing to do with him as he was guilty of treachery towards the Assyrian nation.

If Mar Shimun wishes no discrimination to be made against his supporters by the Iraq Government, he should clearly understand that the latter will tolerate no discrimination by him against those Assyrians who have assisted Government policy.

Perhaps the Minister after receiving the reports of Mutasarrif might instruct the latter to send for Mar Shimun and make this point clear to him.

There is no doubt whatever that Mar Shimun and Surma are much averse to letting their temporal power slip without a struggle.

Their mentality may however be judged by the fact that while openly abusing Great Britain, Mar Shimun recently sent a note to the S.S.O. asking for him to use his influence to secure an appointment in the S.S.O's Department for the Assyrian who accompanied him to Geneva as Secretary.

Number 9.

Administrative Inspector, Mosul, to Adviser, Ministry of Interior, No. 8/28 dated 23rd January, 1933, (Received 31st January, 1933).

Mar Shimun has informed the Assyrians that—

1. A Foreign (i.e. non British or 'Iraqi) settlement officer is to be engaged in connection with Assyrian settlement.

2. The League of Nations is sending a Commission during the spring or summer to make enquiries into all minority affairs in 'Iraq and submit a report to the League.

I would be grateful for definite information as to whether there is any truth in the statement of Mar Shimun, to enable their refutation if necessary.

Number 10.

Administrative Inspector, Mosul to Adviser, Ministry of Interior, No. 8/39 dated 30th January, 1933, (Received 1st February, 1933).

Talk of emigration to Persia, Syria or Turkey has once more appeared amongst the Assyrians and Malik Khoshaba reports that Mar Shimun has told certain Ashuti elements not to accept settlement in the Dashtazi as this is only another trick on the part of the 'Iraq Government to keep them isolated amongst Kurds in the frontier area. Mar Shimun also continues to abuse the British and especially Sir John Simon and Sir Francis Humphrys.

Mar Shimun visited the Mutasarrif today and made it quite clear he had no intention of surrendering his temporal authority, even suggesting that the settlement scheme should be carried out through him.

Mar Shimun also indulged in abuse of His Britannic Majesty's Government. He also visited me but talked of nothing but the weather and other topics unconnected with Assyrians.

Number 11.

Administrative Inspector, Mosul, to Adviser, Ministry of Interior, No. 8/42 of 1st February, 1933.

Reports still continue to be received that Mar Shimun is actively working against the Dashtazi settlement scheme and telling his people not to participate.

He has told certain people to settle in Chem Pashai, situated on the left bank of the Tigris opposite Zummar, telling them that there they would be in a favourable position to emigrate to Syria, is such became necessary.
Mar Shimun has also approached certain Ashutis who had told Malik Khoshaba they wished to go to Dashtazi, and endeavoured to dissuade them from this.

I think the Mutasarrif should be instructed to assemble the Maliks and inform them of the ‘Iraq Government’s good intentions and explain to them the settlement schemes. This might weaken Mar Shimun’s propaganda.

If Mar Shimun persists in his folly (as he undoubtedly will) it will be necessary for Government to summon him and Surma to Baghdad and detain them there permanently.

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Number 12.

Mutasarrif, Mosul Liwa, to the Ministry of Interior No. S/48 of 7th February, 1933, (Translation).

Shlimun bin Malik Ismail arrived at Dohuk on 2nd February, 1933. He was the guest of Monseigneur 'Abdul Ahad and interviewed a party of Assyrians. The Qaimmaqam, Dohuk, ascertained that his discussions were in support of the speech of Mar Shimun already reported in our letter C/26 of 18th January, 1933. He also expressed hopes of giving effect to Assyrian autonomy.

The Qaimmaqam, Dohuk has ascertained that Shlimun’s journey to Dohuk was the result of correspondence, between the Chief Sino, in Gorigawan and certain Tiyari notables in Kiflasin and Machlamakht villages, regarding the failure to achieve what had been promised by Mar Shimun and the sons of Malik Ismail. Shlimun therefore came to re-assure them and offer other promises in order to prevent their abandonment of Mar Shimun’s party and disobedience to him.

As regards the harmful propaganda carried out by Mar Shimun and his followers, this we have already reported in previous reports examining them fully and clearly.

As this propaganda is not void of certain harmful objects detrimental to the interests of the country, please accord us authority to punish those, who try to affect the public security and peace, and to prevent harmful propaganda. It is essential that a special policy be decided upon as we can no longer keep silence at the acts of Mar Shimun and his activities and the propaganda disseminated amongst the inhabitants.

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Number 13.


On 9th instant Mar Shimun, as a result of Squadron Leader Reed’s visit, came to interview the Mutasarrif and then me.

The Mutasarrif will doubtless report the results of his interview, which appears to have been no more satisfactory than mine.

Mar Shimun excused himself for not having been to visit me oftener on the grounds that he had understood that I had now no powers whatever and was in fact merely ‘putting in time to complete my contract’!

He then stated that the ‘Iraq Government was working against him and against those who supported him and gave instances in which prominent Assyrians had been abused by the Qaimmaqams of Dohuk and Amadia.

I am inquiring into these allegations, but from what I have already heard they appear to be grossly exaggerated.

Mar Shimun then enquired from me what role he was expected to play vis-a-vis the ‘Iraq Government. I informed him that the ‘Iraq Government expected him to play that of Patriarch and that he should at first busy himself with studying the various Community Laws so as to be in a position to suggest a draft law for his own Community.
I also told him that the ‘Iraq Government wished Assyrians to deal direct with local authorities instead of ventilating all their alleged grievances through Mar Shimun.

Mar Shimun claimed that Assyrians already deal direct with local authorities and so they do in a sense, but Mar Shimun constantly interferes.

With regard to the settlement scheme, Mar Shimun stated that unless Government carried it out properly (i.e. presumably in accordance with his views!) it would be a complete failure.

I made it clear to him that any Assyrian or group of Assyrians could apply to Government for settlement, but he insisted that they must be settled by tribes and evidently envisages a complete re-settlement of existing villages on this basis.

This presumably is not the intention of the ‘Iraq Government.

I am convinced that Mar Shimun has no intention of supporting or approving any settlement or other scheme which detracts in any way from the temporal influence of his House.

The appointment of the settlement officer is a matter of the greatest urgency, if full advantage is to be taken of next spring and summer.

Number 14.


I will mention the question of opening a Government School at Sarsink to His Majesty at the first opportunity.

His Majesty has given instructions to the Ministries concerned:—

(a) that the Dashtazi scheme be commenced forthwith,
(b) that the services of Mr. Macdonnell, late of the Egyptian Government, be asked for to advise on land settlement,
(c) that discharged Levies be accepted by the ‘Iraq Army,
(d) that the possibility of increasing the area available for land settlement by artesian water be urgently examined,
(e) that the question of providing land for Mar Shimun be studied.

If artesian water can be found, His Majesty thinks there should be no difficulty in allotting a suitable area to him. Have you any others in mind?

As I have already pointed out in a note of which you have a copy, Mar Shimun is bound to intrigue so long as he is without material resources. His Majesty intends to summon him to Baghdad in the near future and to have another talk with him.

Number 15.


It is reported that at a recent meeting at Mar Shimun’s house Malik Khammo of Baz told Mar Shimun that the Assyrians did not want to hear any more about his visit to Geneva and his discussions with the League of Nations; what is vital to the people is the results of his conversations with H.M. the King, the Minister of Interior, &c.

Mar Shimun appears to have been unable or unwilling to satisfy the assembly on this point, and was considerably embarrassed.

After the meeting Surma Khanum approached Mar Serkis, the Bishop of Jilu and Baz, and used very strong expressions regarding Malik Khammo.
The Bishop objected strongly to her using such expressions, pointing out that Malik Khammo had been one of the most loyal supporters of Mar Shimun and his House and had it not been for this Malik, he himself (Mar Serkis) would long ago have been won over to the 'Iraq Government by Makki Beg, Qaimmaqam, Dohuk.

Malik Khammo later hearing of the incident became greatly incensed against Surma and Mar Shimun and it is believed that he, Mar Serkis and others are now intending to produce a "mahdabata" to Government entirely disassociating themselves from Mar Shimun and his policy.

Mar Shimun and Surma recently spoke to the cousin of the priest of Sarsink village, threatening excommunication of the priest for his behaviour in entertaining His Majesty King Faisal last Summer and asking for Government assistance for his school.

Mar Shimun has also recently discussed the possibility of excommunicating Mar Yuwalaha, Bishop of Barwar.

At the moment it appears that Mar Shimun through his violent policy is likely to do his personal cause much damage and considerably weaken his temporal power.

It is being made clear by local authorities to Maliks etc., that the 'Iraq Government does not wish to interfere with the power of Mar Shimun as Patriarch, in fact it wishes to consolidate this power by the production of a Community Law, but is not prepared to tolerate perpetual interference by him and Surma in purely temporal matters.

The latest propaganda against the settlement of the Dashtazi by Lower Tiyaris, Ashutis, &c., is a claim being circulated that the Tkhuma have traditional rights to this area, as they used to come to graze in it prior to the war.

This is only partially correct as they were by no means the only Assyrian tribes who used this grazing area. In any case the Tkhuma have never shown any desire to reassert any ancient claim and settle in Dashtazi and it is unlikely that this propaganda will have much effect.

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Number 16.

Mutasarrif, Mosul Liwa to Mar Shimun, No. 2394 of 25th February, 1933, (Translation).

It has been decided by the settlement committee to depute the member, Rufael Eff., to give you the necessary explanation, in order that you may give your opinion in nominating six persons to the membership of the Local Settlement Committee, according to such explanation as may be given to you by the member, Rufael Eff. It has also been decided that your presence in its next sitting to be held to-morrow morning at 11 o'clock would be appreciated, so that you may express your views, should you so desire.

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Number 17.

Mar Shimun to Mutasarrif, Mosul, No. 125 dated 26th February, 1933, (Translation).

Reference your letter No. 2394 of the 25th instant.

Your messenger Rufael Effendi has handed over to me your letter. In my previous discussion with you on the subject, I trust you will remember that I have told you that I am unable to participate in this question, unless it is according to the policy which had been and is still existing amongst the Assyrians. I regret, therefore, that I am unable to attend your meetings.

Please accept my compliments.
Minutes of the Fifth Meeting of the Assyrian Settlement Committee held on the 26th February, 1933, under the Presidency of the Liwa Mutasarriif, Tahsin Beg al 'Askari.

1. The reply No. 125 dated 26th February, 1933, received by the President of the Committee from Mar Shimun, copy attached, was read; from the contents it was learned that he is neither desirous of attending nor of expressing his views in respect of settlement.

2. It was decided to issue letters to twelve of the Assyrian spiritual and tribal chiefs of various sections, asking them to give the names of six reliable persons of experience in tribal and agricultural matters as nominees for membership of the Local Board of Settlement; a limit of 15 days was fixed within which replies should be received; the correspondence to be conducted through the Qaimmaqams concerned.

Those to be addressed are:

- H.B. Patriarch Mar Shimun
- Archbishop Serkis
- Archbishop Yusif
- Archbishop Yuwalaha
- Malik Khoshaba
- Rais Khayu Odisho
- Malik Khamamo
- Rais Chiko Giyo of Gorigawan
- Malik Ismail
- Malik Nimrud
- Malik Luko
- Malik Marroqi

3. The committee proposes that the president should address the authorities concerned to make a provision of I.D. 300 to be placed at the disposal of the Official Settlement Committee and spent on necessary and urgent matters, such as inspection expenses of the Local Board of Settlement in respect of touring, etc.

4. It has been decided to send copies of minutes of the committee to the Ministry of Interior, Mutasarrif Arbil, and Qaimmaqams, Amadia, Aqrah, and the Commandant of Police, Mosul.

5. The attached programme prepared for the Local Board of Settlement has been approved for execution after the Board has been constituted.

Number 19.

Programme of Local Board of the Assyrian Settlement, formed in accordance with the decision of the Official Settlement Committee on 26th February, 1933. (Translation).

1. The Board shall be called “Local Board of Assyrian Settlement” and will consist of a president, six members and a secretary. It shall be formed in accordance with the decision of the Official Committee.

2. The duties of the board are as follows:

   (a) To express its views regarding the settlement of Assyrians in general and to make recommendations to ensure the success of the settlement scheme to be undertaken by the Official Settlement Committee.

   (b) To prepare lists of families and tribes demanding settlement and to collect all information in this respect.

   (c) To make the Assyrian tribes understand what is necessary in respect of details of settlement and their welfare.

   (d) To execute such decisions of the Official Committee as regards inspection of land, etc., as may be referred to it.
3. The board shall meet on the invitation of the president of the Official Settlement Committee, as may be necessary.

4. The decisions of the board shall be adopted by the Majority of votes.

5. The duties of the President are:
   (a) To preside over the meetings,
   (b) To sign correspondence in the name of the board,
   (c) To represent the board before the Government and the Official Settlement Committee.
   (d) To assemble the board when instructed by the President of the Official Settlement Committee.

6. The secretary shall perform the clerical work of the board and will not participate in voting.

7. The duty of the board is to advise the Official Settlement Committee and to give guidance to the Assyrians in general; it will have no connection with political matters.

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NUMBER 20.


Mar Shimun has now definitely declined to associate himself with the work of this Committee and may in fact be expected to do all in his power to render its efforts abortive.

Rufael Eff. yesterday complained to me that Mar Shimun intends to fight to the last trench to retain his temporal power and will only agree to assist in settlement, provided the whole procedure is in his hands and Malik Khoshaba entirely excluded.

Rufael Eff. also told me that Mar Shimun has told him that he was convinced that the Iraqi Government's friendly overtures to him were only intended to lull him into a state of false security prior to destroying his power entirely.

It will now be necessary to await the result of the circular to Maliks Bishops, etc. regarding members of the Advisory Assyrian Settlement Committee.

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NUMBER 21.


Malik Luko, an Assyrian extremist of Mar Shimun’s Party, is unceasingly spreading propaganda and falsehoods amongst the simple Assyrian villagers. The Qaimmaqam Amadia has now come to understand that this man has informed the muktars of villages and priests on whom he depends that they must be ready to join the Assyrians living in Cham Pashai in Dohuk Qadha and to emigrate from there to the Syrian territories in the spring. He warned them very strictly not to acquire Iraq nationality or obey the orders of officials.

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NUMBER 22.


I was visited this morning by Mar Serkis and Malik Khammo. They intended to see the Mutasariff also but the latter was ill.
From their conversation it appears clear that serious dissension has arisen between the Bishop and Mar Shimun.

From other sources I hear that Mar Serkis recently addressed a meeting of Maliks and others at Doliuk, explaining to them the policy of the Iraq Government and advising them to accept it.

An Assyrian present then started to oppose these views stating that Mar Serkis was a traitor to the Nation. Mar Serkis a man of very powerful physique, thereupon smote his critic who came to Mosul to complain to Mar Shimun.

Mar Shimun summoned Mar Serkis to Mosul and it appears that a very stormy interview took place.

I explained to Mar Serkis and Malik Khammo that the Iraq Government had no evil intention against Mar Shimun but that they were not prepared to accept his acting as a dictator for the whole Assyrian nation.

The Government wished him to set his religious house in order and to this end have encouraged him to draft a Community Law on the lines of those of other Communities. So far he has taken no interest in the proposal.

Mar Serkis also asked me whether Mar Shimun’s statement that the League was sending a Commission for Assyrian settlement was true. I told him it was not true and that all such propaganda should be discredited.

Mar Serkis, Malik Khoshaba, Rais Chiko Giyo, Rais Khiyo Odioso, Malik Nimrod and Malik Khammo have replied to the Mutasarrif proposing 6 persons as members of the Assyrian Advisory Settlement Committee and it is hoped that others may also reply.

Mar Shimun himself has declined to nominate anyone.

Number 23.

Administrative Inspector, Mosul, to Adviser, Ministry of Interior, No. S/98 dated 82th March, 1933, (Received 30th March, 1933).

Mar Shimun is still propagandising actively amongst the Assyrians especially the Ashutis, dissuading them from settling, on the grounds that if they settle before the League of Nations Commission comes out then the Iraq Government will write that all are settled and the Commission will not come.

Mar Serkis and Malik Khammo (Baz) recently proceeded to the Shaikhan area to obtain signatures from the Baz and Jilu tribes that Mar Serkis and Malik Khammo are their leaders.

Their mission proved a failure as the Baz and Jilu stated that they had been settled in their present villages without any assistance or support from the Bishop or the Malik or even from Mar Shimun, and they had always dealt direct with Government and found their dealings quite satisfactory, Under the circumstances they saw no reason to put leaders over them.

I hope to visit Baghdad in the not very distant future and will discuss the whole Assyrian question there.

Number 24.

Notice issued by the Mutasarrif, Mosul, dated 5th April, 1933, (Translation).

Whereas the Government has decided to settle landless Assyrians on its uncultivated lands, those desirous of settlement should submit their applications in writing to the Mutasarrif, Mosul Liwa, and the President of the Official Assyrian Settlement Committee, on the understanding that their settlement will be effected in accordance with Article 10 (c) of the Law for the Collection of Land Rent No. 85 of 1931, on Government lands which will be allotted to them by the Official Assyrian Settlement Committee at Mosul. For Convenience the relative paragraph of the law is appended:
Article 10.—(c).

"State lands not subject to muzara'a which lack means of irrigation and require lifting devices and similarly mawat (dead) lands in need of development (e.g., excavation of new canals, construction of dykes and other development schemes) may be leased by the Minister of Finance on condition that (i) such lands shall be exempt from payment of rental for a period of four complete years with effect from the date of the lease and from half of such rental for a further period of four years following that period.

The Government undertakes that settlement will follow in due course.

The Government will not interrupt their occupation of the lands so long as they continue cultivation and payment of government taxes due in respect thereof.

Applicants are invited to submit their applications within one month from date.

Number 25.

Qaimmaqam, Dohuk to Mutassarift, Mosul Liwa, No. C/56 of 15th April, 1933. (Translation).

1. Mar Shimun and his followers' propaganda has recently developed, and may be summarised as below:

(a) The incitement of Assyrians to adhere to Mar Shimun's policy and not to unite with the Iraq Government.

(b) Instigation against the chiefs and tribes loyal to Government, particularly Malik Khoshaba and Bishop Serkis.

(c) Making Assyrians understand that Mar Shimun has deputed his agent, Mr. Rassam, to Persia; that he has agreed with the Persian Government to the giving of a national home to Assyrians under the leadership of Mar Shimun; and that the Persian Government, thereupon, will give 60000 Tomans on account of transport and migration charges. Therefore, it is necessary not to co-operate with the Government at all and to await Mar Shimun's orders with regard to migration. The news and articles published in certain Iraqi and foreign newspapers in this respect have led many Assyrians to believe the truth of this propaganda.

2. On 12th inst., the British journalist, Mr. Merton, visited Dohuk, and had an interview with each of Malik Khoshaba, Bishop Serkis, Malik Yonan, Assistant Commandant of Police Ezra Eff., Dr. Baba, the Nahiya Mudir Lazar Eff., and the Iais Odisho el Ashuti: and discussed with them in my presence certain Assyrian matters. The above persons disclosed to him many facts concerning Mar Shimun's policy which is harmful to Assyrians, they confirmed that the overwhelming majority of Assyrians are not in agreement with Mar Shimun because of his hostile policy towards the British and Iraq Governments; that they, together with Lower Tiyari, Ashuti and Baz tribes, and all wise Assyrians treat 'Iraq as their home and do not accept any other country; and that they have decided to be loyal subjects of the 'Iraqi Government. They moreover pointed out to Mr. Merton that Mr. Rassam does not represent any of the Assyrians save Mar Shimun, and that the mere object of the latter's policy is to serve his personal aims which are far away from the community's benefit, &c. &c. Mr. Merton has also interviewed the American Missionary Cumberland, and there is no doubt that he heard from this man what would support the views expressed by the above persons, owing to Mr. Cumberland's wisdom and his adherence to truth. At last, when Mr. Merton wished to have an interview with Monseigneur Abdul Ahad (I have already reported on this man), the latter refused to give his opinion in my and Malik Khoshaba's presence, and asked to meet him alone. They therefore had a five minutes interview during which period Abdulahad has undoubtedly informed him of his support of Mar Shimun's views.
3. Yaku bin Malik Ismail, who has recently resigned from the Levy, arrived in Dohuk, and, after two days’ stay, proceeded on the 9th instant to Bageira and Broshki, (the latter village is attached to Amadia Qadha). I learn that he will visit all Upper Tiyari villages in Dohuk and Amadia Qadhas to ask them to agree with the Tkhuma tribe which is loyal to Mar Shimun and to instigate them against the Assyrian tribes who are loyal to the Government, as also to do his best to strengthen Mar Shimun’s party.

It will be observed that the hostile Assyrians have started recently to show openly their evil acts, and that Mar Shimun’s party is becoming stronger day by day, which matter should be treated urgently. The most important reason for this may be attributed to the fact that the Government is playing the role of spectator vis-a-vis those who stir up troubles such as Yaku, Lako and others.

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NUMBER 26.

Administrative Inspector, Mosul, to Adviser, Ministry of Interior
No. S/115 of 23rd April, 1933.

Mar Shimun has interviewed some of the Ashutis, Tkhuma and others who are now in Mosul for the settlement committee meeting and has begged them not to accept settlement.

He has told them that at Geneva the ‘Iraq Government gave a definite declaration to settle the Assyrians within three months and that if they are not settled the League will then send a Commission which will settle the Assyrians in exact accordance with their wishes.

This clearly demonstrates the reason for Mar Shimun’s opposing settlement.

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NUMBER 27.

Administrative Inspector, Mosul, to Adviser, Ministry of Interior,
No. S/144 dated 10th May, 1933, (Received 13th May, 1933).

As I am shortly proceeding on leave I think the time has now come for a careful appreciation of the Assyrian question and especially of the activities of Mar Shimun, Surma and the sons of Malik Ismail.

(1) It is now definitely established that not only will Mar Shimun give no support to the Deshtazi or any Government settlement scheme but that he will use every means in his power to upset such schemes, in order to be in a position to submit a complaint to the League of Nations that ‘Iraq has failed to make good her promises.

(2) It is also clear from information received from Shaikhan, Amadia and Dohuk that Mar Shimun’s propaganda and the tours of Yaku Malik Ismail have not only had an adverse effect on the Government settlement scheme but that they are also producing a distinct feeling of unrest amongst the majority of settled Assyrians.

Mar Shimun’s policy of non-cooperation with Government is also the subject of much discussion amongst Kurds in some areas, and it is to be feared that the deliberate flouting of Government authority by Assyrians may be followed by attempts by Kurds to behave in a similar manner.

(3) Recently also a number of complaints by Assyrians have been submitted to the R.A.F. authorities in Baghdad through David Mar Shimun. Only one or two out of about a dozen bear any resemblance to the truth and in practically no case had reference been made by the supposedly aggrieved parties to the proper local authorities. This still further proves the success of Mar Shimun’s campaign.

(4) It is also now definitely established that Mar Shimun’s is determined to leave no stone unturned to force the ‘Iraq Government to admit to him both full temporal and spiritual powers.
At the moment he is engaged in obtaining "madhabatas" from his supporters demanding that they should be dealt with through him in all matters, in a manner similar to that of tribesmen and their Shaikh.

(5) Mar Shimun is still apparently negotiating with the Persian Consul, Mosul, and is believed to be endeavouring to get the Persian Government to grant better terms for the "exodus of the Assyrian Nation". It is not thought however that, even were such terms granted he or the Assyrians would go to Persia but that he wishes to use the Persian offer as a lever to force the 'Iraq Government to admit his omnipotence.

(6) The season is now not far off when Mar Shimun and Surma transfer their "Court" to Ser Amadia and both the Mutasarrif and I are convinced that to allow them to proceed thither would be a fatal mistake. The Mutasarrif is writing to the Minister on the subject.

(7) I feel that the time is probably approaching when Government will be compelled to call a halt to the activities of Mar Shimun. It is of course extremely difficult to take action against him or his strongest supporters without endowing them with the halos of martyrs, but as Government has tried without success every other means of persuading Mar Shimun to accept the position admitted to him by Government, force of a kind may ultimately become necessary.

(8) A possible course of action would be for Government to summon Mar Shimun, Surma, Malik Ismail and his sons to Baghdad and make it quite clear to them that it will not accept the wielding of temporal power by Mar Shimun nor his subversive activities nor those of Malik Ismail's sons.

Unless or until Government is convinced that Mar Shimun accepts the position (be never will), he, Surma and the sons of Malik Ismail should be forbidden to proceed to the Mosul or Arbil Liwas.

It could also be made clear to Mar Shimun that the 'Iraq Government far from opposing the emigration of the Patriarchal house and as many followers as will go with them, is prepared to assist in such emigration by taking up the matter with the Persian or other Governments.

(9). In the Levies at Mosul is an officer, Gewergis, (Tkhuma) of whom frequent reports are still received alleging that when off duty he is active in supporting the propaganda of Mar Shimun. The transfer of this officer to Hinaidi is desirable.

Number 28.

Qaimmaqam, Amadia, to Mutasarrif, Mosul, No. 85 dated 21st May, 1933, (Translation).

Malik Khammu informs me that Mar Shimun has issued an order to the Assyrian sheep-owners that each of them should go to the place to be chosen by him, and that they should not regard the orders of chiefs appointed by the Government. As a proof of this information, some of them have proceeded to the frontier without our knowledge, and were also observed by the Administrative Inspector.

The Mukhtar of Jamausak village, Yokhana, reports that the inhabitants of his village refused to accept the police notice to go to the Qadha Headquarters and that this was due to the advice of Mar Shimun. As these reports are inconsistent with Mar Shimun's verbal promises I have recorded them for information. In this connection, I consider it advisable that Mar Shimun should be asked to make an official publication declaring his present attitude towards the Government and stating that he will not interfere in Assyrian temporal matters.

Number 28 (a).

Yaqu Son of Malik Ismail to Qaimmaqam Dohuk dated 22nd May, 1933. (Translation).

I came to-day to Qadha Headquarters as ordered. As ill luck would have it, you were ill and I could not see you.
I learned that you wanted to take a guarantee from me not to move amongst the Upper Tiyaris, as though I am poisoning their minds, etc. I dealt with these people in accordance with your statement to me before I went to them. You told me that those who did not wish to stay in Iraq were free to go wherever they wished, and that the Government would pay their expenses to outside the Iraqi frontiers. I therefore spoke with them accordingly.

The reasons why we (the Assyrians) did not take part in the elections was in compliance with the wishes of our chiefs, because he who took part in the election and he who may take part, will be disgraced by his tribesmen; as no one will listen to him or know him. Then he will also be disgraced by the Government on account of his failure. Please dont listen to the statements of evil doers who display opposition to Government administration. Our aim is only to carry out the orders of the Government especially with regards to her demands such as Koda, Arms and Istihlak taxes, etc. For this reason, therefore, if we leave or stay in Iraq peacefely, it does not mean that we are doing against the obedience to the Government policy; for this is in accordance with your statement and verbal orders when I called to see you on the last day of Id al Adha. This took place in the presence of witnesses known to you, if you have not forgotten them. Under the circumstances, I request you to excuse me in advance for being unable to appear a second time before you, as I am occupied by household affairs. In conclusion I wish you health and prosperity.

NUMBER 29.

Ministry of Interior to Mar Shimun No. C/1104 dated 28th May, 1933, (Translation).

During my recent visit to Mosul, I explained to you the attitude of Government with regard to your personal position and I now wish to confirm in writing what you have already heard verbally.

The Government is willing to recognise you officially as the Spiritual Head of the Assyrian Community and to promise that you will at all times receive the respect due to you as the holder of that position. As you have already been told by the Mutasarrif of Mosul, it is anxious to enlist your help in preparing a Community Law on the lines of those already in force in the case of other communities. In order that your spiritual dignity should be properly maintained it has under consideration the creation of a source of income to assist you in permanent manner and it does not intend to curtail the monthly allowance which is at present paid to you until such time as it is satisfied that you have ample provision from other sources.

I must however make it clear that the Government cannot agree to delegate to you any temporal authority. Your position will be the same as that of the other Spiritual Heads of Communities in Iraq; in all matters of administration the members of the Assyrian Community must conform to the laws, regulations and manner of procedure which applies to all other Iraqis.

I need not assure you how sincerely anxious the Government is to do everything possible to see the Assyrian Community like other Iraqis, happy and contented and loyal subjects of His Majesty the King. It has declared its policy fully to the League of Nations at Geneva which intimated its approval.

Amongst other things, in accordance with an agreement reached there last autumn, it is obtaining the services of a foreign expert to advise in the important matter of Land Settlement. This expert, Major Thomson, is expected to arrive in Mosul at the end of this month. His work will be of the greatest importance to the Assyrian Community and I trust that he will receive the fullest assistance from all those who have the welfare of the Community at heart. I have noticed with regret that you have up to the present adopted an unhelpful and, according to some reports, even an
obstructive, attitude in this very important matter and I am therefore com­
pelled to ask you to give me a written guarantee that you will do nothing to
make the task of Major Thomson and the Government more difficult.

If there are any points which I have not made clear in this letter, I shall
be glad if you will bring them to my notice. The recognition of your posi­
tion as described above is conditional on your acceptance of it and on your
giving a solemn promise that you will in all ways and at all times act as a
loyal subject of His Majesty the King. I shall be obliged if you will do
this in a written reply to this letter in the form attached.

--- O ---

ENCLOSURE TO No. 29, (Translation).

I, Mar Shimun, have perused your Excellency’s letter No. S/1104 dated
28th May, 1933, and accepted all what is contained therein.

I hereby undertake that I will do nothing to make the task of Major
Thomson and the Iraq Government in connection with the settlement Scheme
difficult and that I will in all ways and at all times act as a
loyal subject of His Majesty the King.

--- O ---

NUMBER 30.

Mar Shimun to H.M. King Faisal, dated 31st May, 1933.

I humbly request leave to give Your Majesty my opinion in the following
lines about the present policy of the Mosul authorities, as I see it to settle the
Assyrian question.

Knowing that a word from Your Majesty at this hour to Your Majesty’s
Advisers could change this policy, and thus bring the affairs of the Assyrians
to a successful issue.

I was ordered by the Mutasarrif of Mosul with great urgency to proceed
to Baghdad immediately in response to an invitation from the Minister of
Interior, to discuss with him and Major D. B. Thomson the Foreign Expert for
the new Assyrian Settlement Scheme of the Assyrian affairs.

On the 6th day after my arrival in Baghdad, and after many attempts,
I was granted an interview with H.E. the Minister of Interior.

In the meantime I have word from Mosul that the authorities there are
still continuing with their old policy with regard to the Assyrian question. If
this is the case it is inconsistent with the purpose of my invitation to Baghdad
as explained to me.

I very much regret to have to bring it to Your Majesty’s notice that during
my interview with H.E. the Interior Minister I was informed of the unfavour­
able attitude of the present Government towards me personally.

If I did not participate with the present policy adopted by Mosul authorities
the reason has been that the policy was entirely unconstructive.

I do feel most confident that the present policy which has now for sometime
been carried on by the Mosul Liwa authorities only, as I presume, and which has
already proved a failure, is not consistent with the noble spirit of Your Majesty,
which has more than once been most graciously expressed to me by Your Majesty
personally.

I take the advantage of Your noble spirit and fatherly kindness to assure
myself that Your Majesty’s desire is to make the Assyrian people a contented,
loyal and helpful subject people within Your Majesty’s Dominion, and to
attain this end I am ready as I always have been to offer my utmost services
to Your Majesty.

Hoping at this late hour that some constructive scheme can be arranged,
which will enable my people and myself to prove to Your Majesty’ person our
loyalty and gratitude.
I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency’s letter No. S. 1104 dated the 28th May, 1933, and I am with due respects replying to its essential points as follows:

1. With regard to my interview with Your Excellency on the 12th April, 1933, at Mosul, may I request Your Excellency’s recollection to the conversation which then took place. Your Excellency said that a new co-operative policy with regard to the Assyrian Settlement Scheme would be introduced by you, and that the orders would be issued to the Mutassarif to that effect, and that he would also be asked to consult me on all matters affecting the Assyrians.

2. The Community Law mentioned in Your Excellency’s letter however useful factor it may be, at this stage of affairs would appear to be an immatured measure, owing to the fact that such a law is necessarily applicable to a settled community. Moreover, in order to formulate this law time would be required to consult with the Cannons of the Church.

3. With regard to the term “Temporal Power” alluded to by Your Excellency when you say “the Government cannot agree to transfer to you any temporal power”. I would be glad to know how this term is interpreted by you. Although I do not desire to dwell on this point in length I think it is necessary for me to try and elucidate the term “Spiritual and Temporal” power united together in this special case of the Patriarch Catholics of the “East”, since it seems to me, that Your Excellency and the Government have taken a grave view of it. This Patriarchal authority is a great historical and traditional usage of the Assyrian people and Church and it has been one of the established and most important customs. The temporal power has not been assumed by me but it has descended to me from centuries past as a legalised delegation of the people to the Patriarch. It was not only tolerated but also officially recognised in past by the old Sassanite Kings, Islamic Caliphs, Mogul Khans and Ottoman Sultans. No proof of any misuse of this power as far as any King of Government whose subjects the Assyrian people have been can be traced in history. Whilst on the other hand besides being in no way preventative to the application of the law of the country, it has proved to be the best method of dealing with a people living under the circumstances as the Assyrians are.

Under the above circumstances I very much regret to say that it is impossible for me to comply with your order viz. to sign the written promise outlined by your Excellency, since such an action would only mean that I am willingly withdrawing myself from the duty to my people; the duty which as mentioned above is a legal delegation of the people to me and it is only to them to take it away. In this connection I would further like to point out that, I am very much surprised by the step your Excellency have proposed to take, more so under the present circumstances, since such an action is only applicable in case of a rebel. This being so, may I ask your Excellency whether my honour and the honour of my people has not been insulted.

I fail to trace any precedent to this action of your Excellency unless I am to blame because I most candidly have represented the case of my Assyrian people, in a legal manner before the late Mandatory Power, the League of Nations and His Majesty’s Government with a view of securing a solution to it which I believe it is in the interests of all concerned.

4. With regard to the allegation that I have hitherto adopted an unfavourable and rather obstructive attitude towards the Assyrian Settlement Scheme. This point was also verbally raised by Your Excellency during my interview with you on the 31st May, when I more than once asked for facts of this allegation. This is more discouraging to me, when I think of my incessant endeavours in persuading my Assyrian people to settle and become a useful element in this country as also they have been hitherto.
I close this my letter with offering my respects to Your Excellency and with apology for having to write it in a foreign language as at present I have not a suitable writer in Arabic at my disposal.

If there are any points which Your Excellency wishes to learn from me I shall be only too glad to answer them, as I propose to leave Baghdad on Monday evening, the 4th June.

Number 32.


I send you a copy of a note which I have written to His Excellency the Minister of Interior on our conversation of this morning.

I shall be grateful if you will confirm that it correctly represents what passed between us.

Enclosure to 32.

Sir K. Cornwallis to H.E the Minister of Interior dated 6th June, 1933.

I saw His Beatitude Mar Shimun this morning and discussed with him his letter of June 3rd, to Your Excellency. I pointed out to him that certain passages in his letter were liable to misconstruction and said that I wished to clear up the misunderstanding which would inevitably arise.

The result of our discussion was as follows:

1. It became clear to me that His Beatitude feels that he has been misrepresented by ill wishers and that the assurances which he was asked to give, implied a slur on his loyalty and honour which is not justified. This feeling undoubtedly influenced him when replying to Your Excellency.

2. His Beatitude expressed his gratitude and thanks to Your Excellency for your kindness in saying that the Government has under consideration the creation of a source of income to assist him in a permanent manner. He places the needs of his community above his own and considers that if the intention is to allocate lands to himself personally or in the name of the community, such allocation should be made during the course of the settlement and with due regard to the needs of individuals.

3. As regards his personal position, His Beatitude fully recognizes that in all matters of administration the members of the Assyrian community must conform to the laws, regulations and manner of procedure which applies to other Iraqis. He has always advised the Assyrians in this sense and will continue doing so. His aim is always to make the Assyrians loyal and law abiding citizens. He considers, however, that the local officials have not been carrying out a wise policy and he fears that the Assyrians may get out of control. He cited a number of cases in which he thought injustice had been shown.

The Assyrians have always been in the habit of coming to their Patriarch with their troubles and he feels that it is his duty to represent their grievances to Government. He stated that he had nothing to add to this.

4. His Beatitude denied the reports that he has worked against Land Settlement; on the contrary he considers it vital for the Assyrians, is most anxious to see it brought about and will not do anything to make the task of Major Thomson and the Government more difficult. He does not, however, consider that the committee which has been appointed is truly representative of the community and fears that the settlement on its present lines will be a failure.

He considers—

(a) that the first action to take is to ascertain the number to be settled immediately and in the future.

(b) that land registration should be carried out as soon as possible.
(c) that those who are now in privately owned lands and for whom Government lands can be found, should be given a title in due course after they have moved. They should not take precedence over Assyrians who have no lands and who apply for settlement on Government lands.

(d) that the question of financial assistance to settlers should be considered. I said that this could not be considered now and that I could not say whether Major Thomson would make any recommendations in this regard.

5. His Beatitude feels aggrieved that his loyalty to His Majesty the King should have been called in question as he has frequently in the past both in action and in writing given expression of it.

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NUMBER 33.

Major Thomson to Mar Shimun No. T/A/1 dated 7th June, 1933.

I am writing to let you know that I am leaving Baghdad this evening on my return to Mosul.

My present intention is to leave Mosul for Amadia on Saturday next and to visit the Assyrian villages, the Dashtazi and other possible areas for Assyrian settlement.

When we had our talk on Monday you will remember you promised to write me a letter setting out your appreciation of the present policy for Assyrian settlement, with your remarks thereon.

You also promised to send me a list of Assyrian notables whom you would like me to see and with whom I might talk over the general situation, and who who would also be willing to act on the Assyrian Advisory Committee in Mosul.

Should any of these gentlemen like to accompany me on my present tour and those in the coming months I should welcome them gladly.

I am looking forward to having the pleasure of meeting you in Mosul in the near future and of further discussing the question of Assyrian settlement.

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NUMBER 34.

From His Beatitude Eshai Shimun to Major B. D. Thomson letter dated the 7th June, 1933.

I hasten to reply to your urgent letter of June 7th, informing me of your immediate departure for Mosul and Districts.

May I inform you that the statements you have recorded in this letter as from me are contrary to what I said.

I certainly did not inform you that I appreciated the Mosul policy towards the Assyrian Settlement of the last months, which could be implied in your letter. I fully explained the importance of the need to change this policy.

I said if you wished I would gather together the people's appointed representatives to meet you at Mosul, or you should visit and interview the people themselves to enable you to view the situation rightly. I did not promise to write you a list of names.

I said that if you wished I would be glad to give you in writing my opinion on the present situation and this is now in the course of preparation.

I also informed you that I was awaiting an answer to my letter to His Excellency the Minister of Interior, regarding the Government's interpretation of the Patriarch's 'Temporal Power' and its attitude towards me. My cooperation in the future naturally has to depend on that reply.

It would help me greatly if you could enlighten me as to exactly what your position is.

* Mar Shimun evidently misunderstood the meaning of the word "appreciation".
Number 35.

Mar Shimun to Sir K. Cornwallis No. C/288 dated 8th June, 1933.

I thank you for your letter of the 6th, sending me a copy of the Notes of my interview with you on that morning, which you have sent to His Excellency the Minister of Interior, and I thank you for the interest and labour for the affairs of my people.

On the whole the Notes do correctly represent what passed between us. There are, however, some things I would like to state differently and again other things recorded. For instance.—

Para 1 the last thought. May I state no feelings influenced my reply to His Excellency. The fact is that I could not reply to the letter of the Government otherwise before consulting my people.

In para 2 and elsewhere in these Notes I would like that the word Community be understood to mean the Assyrian people.

Para 3 the importance of this para would be better understood if it is realised that the Assyrians, unlike other Communities, are refugees and homeless and the idea behind the League of Nations by a homogeneous settlement is to replace their homelands and make them contented loyal subjects. This is not being done, on the contrary after 12 years there is not one instance where an Assyrian has received title deed substitute of his lost home. The Assyrian refugees, however, voted for the Mosul Vilayet to be included in Iraq for this purpose.

With regard to the last part of para 3, I would like to add that the traditional customs of the people, should not be interfered with as at present. The same privileges are maintained by other tribal people in Iraq.

In conclusion I would appeal to you to see my position as it now is, and advise me as to how I can possibly fulfill my duty to my people as well as comply with the requests from all sides.

1. Major Thomson as the Expert Adviser requests my assistance to bring about a Settlement Scheme.
2. You as the Adviser to the Ministry of Interior asked me for my views to present them to the Minister of Interior, and send you copies of my proposals to Major Thomson.
3. His Excellency the Minister who represents the Government has ordered me to retire from all temporal affairs of my people. Therefore, under these circumstances it becomes impossible for me to comply with all these requests.

I have under preparation proposals for a Scheme of Settlement which will be in the interests of all concerned.

The presentation of these proposals depends on the change of the present policy.

Number 36.

Administrative Inspector, Mosul, to Adviser, Ministry of Interior No. S/182 of 5th June, 1933, received on 8th June, 1933.

1. I forward herewith, in case you have not seen it, a translation of letter addressed by Yaku son of Malik Ismail to the Qaimmaqam, Dohuk.* As you will remember this man came to the Qadha Headquarters with an armed following of 30 men. He was recently a Levy Officer and his father Malik Ismail of the Upper Tiyari was until recently cultivating in the Diana district.
2. A few days ago a Russian was arrested in Dohuk Qadha. Little has been discovered as to his antecedents but it appears that he entered Iraq from Persia. What is important is that he spent some days with various Assyrians who appear to have been at pains to keep him away from Government posts.

*No. 28a
This has had the unfortunate effect of increasing still further the suspicions of local officials as to the intentions of the Assyrians.

3. The Qaimmaqam of Dohuk has reported that Malik Ismail and other Assyrian leaders have been making overtures to certain Kurds with a view to an agreement as to their joint attitude vis a vis the Government. The Assyrians are also stated to have made advances to the Chaldean Christians in this area.

**Number 37.**

*Qaimmaqam, Dohuk, to Mutassarif, Mosul, No. C/77 dated 13th June, 1933, (Translation).*

I forward herewith copy of memorandum No. 2253 dated 13th June, 1933, received from the Station House Officer, Dohuk. It appears to you that the spirit of resistance amongst Mar Shimun’s followers has come to light; a matter which should be treated at the earliest possible date, before it takes another stage which would be a danger to public security.

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*Station House Officer, Dohuk, to Qaimmaqam, Dohuk, No. 2235 dated 13th June, 1933, (Translation).*

In my memo. No. 2178 dated 6th June, 1933, I instructed the head of Faida police post to send certain Assyrians to bring in their rifles for taking their numbers and registration in a special register prepared for this purpose, in accordance with the instructions of the Commandant of Police.

In his letter No. 274 of 8th June, 1933, the head of the said post replied that one Malik Benyamin of the Upper Tiyari tribe, who is one of Mar Shimun’s followers residing at Talkhashan village, has refused to come in saying “I will not proceed to Dohuk nor to any other Government Headquarters, and you may do what you want”.

The said Malik has already disobeyed orders. It is therefore requested to take necessary legal action against him for his resistance and disobedience. Attached please find copy of letter I received from the Head of Faida Post.

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**Number 38.**

*Draft letter from Minister of Interior to Mar Shimun.*

I have received your letter of the 3rd instant and as I have informed you verbally, I consider it so ambiguous that I cannot take it as a reply to my letter of the 28th May.

2. I have, however, read your letter of 31st May, 1933, to His Majesty the King. I have also read a note by the Adviser, dated 7th instant, recording the result of a conversation with you and your reply of June 8th, to him. I have also had a discussion with you on June 8th.

3. I take note from the above.—

(a) You fully recognize that in all matters of administration, Assyrians must conform to the laws, regulations and manner of procedure which applies to all other ‘Iraqis. You have always advised them in this sense and will continue doing so; your aim is always to make the Assyrians loyal and law abiding citizens.

(b) You consider that land settlement is vital for the Assyrians. You are most anxious to see it brought about and you assure me that you will not do anything to make the task of Major Thomson and the Government more difficult.
4. As regards your personal position I confirm to you what I explained in my letter No. C/1104 dated 28th May, 1933, namely that it will resemble that of the spiritual heads of the other communities in ‘Iraq, and the Government cannot delegate to you any temporal power. But, as you are aware, it is the right of every ‘Iraqi to petition the Government on any subject, and spiritual heads of communities have always been accustomed to bring to its notice the needs and grievances of their people. Therefore if you have any complaints at any time I am ready to cause inquiries to be made.

I notice that you have complained of the policy which you say is being adopted in Mosul. The policy of Government is perfectly clear. It is to treat the Assyrians with fairness and justice like all other ‘Iraqis; to make them loyal and contented subjects of His Majesty the King and to effect their permanent settlement in a manner which will lead to this end. Unfortunately up to the present certain sections of the Assyrians have held aloof from Government and they have only themselves to blame if they are looked upon with suspicion. I wish however to put an end to this state of things and I sincerely hope that all Assyrians will show their loyalty by co-operating fully with Major Thomson and by giving him all the assistance for which he asks. If this is done, I have no doubt, that there will be a rapid and I hope permanent improvement in the situation.

I shall be obliged if you will acknowledge this letter.

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NUMBER 39.

Draft Letter from Mar Shimun to H.E. the Minister of Interior.

I thank Your Excellency for your statement of the policy of the Government and I for my part will advise all Assyrians who may come to me to give any assistance to Major Thomson for which he may ask.

With renewed assurances of my loyalty to H.M. the King and His Government.

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NUMBER 40.

Mar Shimun to Sir K. Cornwallis No. Nil dated 13th June, 1933, (Received 15th June, 1933).

I return herewith the draft copies you handed to me of the proposed letter from His Excellency the Minister of Interior and my acknowledgement thereof.

I also enclose a copy of the suggested letter as modified by me after full consideration in the interests of all concerned.

I thank you very much for the trouble you are taking in this matter.

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Enclosure I to 40.

Draft Letter to His Beatitude the Mar Shimun from His Excellency the Minister of Interior.

I have received your letter of the 3rd instant and as I have informed you verbally, I consider it so ambiguous that I cannot take it as a reply to my letter of the 28th May.

2. I have, however, read your letter of the 31st May, 1933, to His Majesty the King. I have also read a note by the Adviser dated the 7th instant, recording the result of conversation with you and your reply of June 8th, to him. I have also had a discussion with you on June 8th.

3. I take note from the above:

(a) You fully recognise that in matters of administration, Assyrians must conform to laws, regulations and manner of procedure which
applies to all other Iraqis. You have always advised them in this sense and will continue doing so; your aim is always to make the Assyrians loyal and law abiding citizens. On the other hand the Government fully realise that the Assyrians unlike other communities are refugees and homeless and the idea behind the League of Nations by a homogeneous settlement is to substitute their homelands and make them contented subjects.

(b) You consider that land settlement is vital for the Assyrians. You are anxious to see it brought about and you assure me that you will do everything possible to make the task of Major Thomson and the Government's easier.

4. But as regards your personal position I confirm to you that it will resemble that of spiritual heads of other communities in 'Iraq, and that the traditional and established customs of your Assyrian people will be privileged to remain. You will have the right to petition His Majesty the King, or his Government regarding the needs and grievances of your people.

I notice that you have complained of the policy which you say is being adopted in Mosul. I will issue instructions to the Mutasarrif of Mosul Liwa to conform to the Government's policy and the contents of this letter and I hope you will make known to Major Thomson your proposals for settling the Assyrians.

The policy of the Government is perfectly clear. It is to treat the Assyrians with fairness and justice like all other 'Iraqis, to make them loyal and contented subjects of His Majesty the King, and to effect the permanent settlement in a manner that will lead to this end.

I, therefore, sincerely hope that you will advise all the Assyrians to show their loyalty by co-operating fully with Major Thomson, and by giving him all the assistance for which he asks. If this is done, I have no doubt that there will be a rapid and I hope permanent improvement in the situation.

I shall be obliged if you will acknowledge this letter.

ENCLOSURE II TO 40.

Draft from Mar Shimun to the Minister of Interior.

I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your memorandum No. of .

I thank your Excellency for your statement of the policy of the Government and I for my part will advise the Assyrians to give any assistance to Major Thomson for which he may ask.

With renewed assurances of my loyalty to His Majesty the King and His Government.

NUMBER 41.

Minister of Interior to Mar Shimun No. C/1239 of 18th June, 1933.

See Number 38.

NUMBER 42.

Administrative Inspector, Mosul, to Adviser, Ministry of Interior, No. S/195 dated 15th June, 1933, (Received 18th June, 1933).

On Monday June 12th, 1933, Major Thomson and myself visited Dohuk. It was arranged that on our return on June 14, certain Assyrian leaders should be requested by the Quaimmaqam to come into Dohuk in order that Major Thomson should be able to speak to them regarding land settlement. Among those invited
was Malik Ismail. He, however, was sick and had left for Baghdad. His son Yaku came in his place. He arrived, however, accompanied by 25 armed men. Major Thomson, on hearing this, naturally refused to see him. To bring a large armed force to a private interview was insulting not only to Major Thomson but to the Government.

It is to be noted that this is not the first time that Yaku has behaved in this manner. On May 21st he was summoned by the Qaimmaqam to Dohuk and came with 35 armed men. I do not consider that such conduct should be tolerated. It would not be tolerated in the case of Kurds or Arabs and therefore should not be in the case of Assyrians. Apart from anything else the effect on the minds of the Kurds is disturbing.

I have recommended to the Mutasarrif that the Qaimmaqam should be instructed to order Yaku to report to him. When he does so, Yaku should be sent to Mosul where an undertaking for good behaviour should be taken from him. From personal enquiries which I have made I do not consider that Yaku is likely to refuse to come in. In the unlikely event of his refusing, he will have to be brought in by force. This may lead to trouble, but even if it does the situation must be faced. If it is allowed to continue, it will become even more aggravated than it is now.

The Qaimmaqam gave the names of certain other Assyrians who are reported to have been spreading lying reports of an insulting nature. I gave a list of these to the Mutasarrif and recommended that certain of these should also be sent to Mosul. The dissemination of false reports is an offence against the laws of the country and in view of the damage which is being caused by them to the interests of the Assyrians themselves, should not be disregarded.

Number 43.

Mar Shimun to Minister of Interior, No. A.P.S. 45 dated 21st June, 1933.

As arranged with you this morning I am returning to Mosul tomorrow Wednesday June 22nd, but I do not wish to leave Baghdad without expressing once more to your Excellency my appreciation of your courtesy in receiving me, and of the patient hearing which you have given me.

While unfortunately there are several points on which we have not yet reached an understanding, nevertheless I wish to assure your Excellency that the dominant desire of my heart is to see the Assyrian People content and happily settled in 'Iraq as loyal subjects to His Majesty the King and His Government.

Number 44.


We give herewith copy of the Madhabata submitted to us from Amadin for information. Begins:

"We the undersigned greatly regret the action of Yaku Malik Ismail who brought 100 armed men on the route of Malik Khoshaba, Malik Chikko and Malik Zaia, in order to kill them, we now consider these three Malikas as already killed. Although prepared to revenge in this hour we do not wish to do what is contrary to the laws and the honour of the Government. We inform the Government to punish the defiant Yaku or else we will take our revenge ourselves. We request Government not to blame us.

(Signed) Mar Yuwalaha, Malik Khoshaba, Malik Chikko, Qas Odisho, Malik Sliwoo, Rais Odish, Rais Chorshino, Sliwoo Ishaq, Rais Sada, Rais Khoshaba, Rais Shlimon, Rais Yokhanna."
The following is a brief summary of the alarms and excursions of June 19th, together with my comments.

This note should be read in conjunction with Mutasarrif’s Code Telegram and No. S/155 of 19th June, 1933, addressed to the Ministry of Interior, with which he forwards a copy of the Qaimmaqam, Dohuk’s report No. S/81.

(1) It had been reported that Yaku son of Malik Ismail after his interview with the Qaimmaqam Dohuk on June 15th had not returned to Simel but had gone to Bageira (on the main road half way between Dohuk and Suwara Tuka). He was reported to have about 30 men with him.

(2) Rumours had been current for some days past that an attempt was to be made on the life of Malik Khoshaba.

(3) On June 19th, Malik Khoshaba who was in Dohuk informed the Qaimmaqam that he proposed going to Amadiya. The Qaimmaqam told him that he had received reports that Yaku was awaiting him on the road with a body of men. Khoshaba said that he was not frightened and was determined to go. He had with him Malik Khiyo of the Ashuti and Malik Zaia Shams-al-Din of the Lower Tiyari. The Qaimmaqam being unable to dissuade Khoshaba decided to send an escort of two armed police cars. They left Dohuk at 11 a.m. It is reported that neither Khoshaba nor any of his companions were armed.

(4) At 1.45 p.m. the Mutasarrif was informed by telephone from Amadia and Suwara Tuka, (1) that the cars had not arrived at Suwara Tuka which is only one hour and a half by car from Dohuk (2) that a police constable from Gorigawan police post had just arrived at Suwara Tuka and had reported that he had seen Yaku on the road with upwards of 300 armed men.

The impression that these telephone reports gave, was that Malik Khoshaba and the police cars had been stopped by Yaku’s followers.

The Mutasarrif immediately sent for the Comandant of Police and instructed him to arrange for the despatch of police reinforcements to Dohuk. He also sent for the O.C. Iraq Troops and informed him of the situation. The Officer Commanding issued a “stand by” order to the troops.

At 2.15 p.m. a telephone message was received from Suwara Tuka that the cars had arrived. It was confirmed in this message that Yaku had over 300 armed men with him. He had, however, made no attempt to stop the cars. The Police Inspector, had spoken to him and asked him what he was doing. He replied that he was visiting friends. The Inspector advised him to disperse his men. He obeyed this order as Mr. Colvin, the Irrigation Engineer who was returning from Dashtazi, passed Bageira at about 2.30 p.m. and saw no gathering.

(5) In the meantime there was some excitement at Dohuk over the arrest of an Assyrian named Werda Bernadan on a charge of having used threatening language to Malik Chikko, who is a member of the Assyrian Advisory Settlement Board. Another Assyrian was also accused but he had left with Yaku.

(6) It is reported that Malik Chikko who belongs to the Upper Tiyari (Malik Ismail’s tribe) and who lives near Bageira was alarmed by the reports of Yaku’s concentration and he himself gathered about 40 men of his own followers. They remained at Gorigawan police post, which is about two kilometres from Bageira.
It was further reported that some Kurds had lined the heights commanding the road. These reports have not been confirmed.

**COMMENTS:**

(1) I am rather doubtful whether an attempt on the life of Malik Khoshaba and his companions was actually intended. It is probable, however, that Yaku did intend to stop the car and to remonstrate, possibly violently with Malik Khoshaba. I consider that the Qaimmaqam was fully justified in sending the police cars as an escort.

(2) The reports regarding the numbers of men with Yaku vary considerably. There certainly were not anything like 300. It appears that Yaku himself had only about 30 men but a number of men from neighbouring Assyrian villages had joined him. Possibly the total number was in the neighbourhood of 100. The Qaimmaqam Dohuk informed me that he thought there were about 200, but the Inspecting Officer of Police who has seen the Police Inspector who was with the armed cars tells me that the latter reports to him that the number was from 80 to 100. Yaku, himself, admits that there were at least 80.

(3) From reports received there is little doubt that Yaku was visiting the villages in the Bageira area, which are mainly occupied by the followers of Malik Ismail (see remarks above regarding Malik Chikko). It appears that he was doing so on the instructions of the Mar Shimun. What his real object was can only be surmised, but it must have been connected with Mar Shimun's anti-Land Settlement and anti-Government propaganda.

(4) The Qaimmaqam has written to Yaku telling him to report to Dohuk in order that he may explain what took place on June 19. It is to be hoped that he will obey. Major Sargon the Inspecting Officer of Police visited Gorigawan yesterday (June 20) and sent for Yaku who was still at Bageira. He strongly advised Yaku to obey the Qaimmaqam's order when he received it. Yaku stated he would do whatever the Mar Shimun advised.

(5) I need not emphasise the seriousness of the situation which will arise if Yaku refuses to come in. If the Government attempts to bring him in by force and he resists, a general outbreak may occur. If, on the other hand the Government takes no action, its prestige is lowered and the Assyrians will be encouraged still further to flout the orders of the Government. I trust, therefore, that wise counsels will prevail.

(6) As regards immediate action to be taken, I recommend that:

(1) the police at Dohuk and at Suwara Tuka should be very strongly reinforced,

(2) that orders be issued to all mukhtars of villages whether Kurd or Assyrian forbidding (a) the collection of bodies of more than 10 armed men (b) the travelling together of more than 6 armed men, unless permission has been obtained from the local authorities.

(3) that the question of sending of reinforcements to this Liwa should be studied in Baghdad.

(7) How far the behaviour of Yaku is a bluff, it is difficult to tell. Personally I think that at the present time it is a bluff. But it will not remain bluff unless the bluff is called. I therefore consider action should be taken at once. Rumours of an unsettling nature are already current in Mosul.
NUMBER 46.
Administrative Inspector, Mosul, to Adviser, Ministry of Interior, No. S/201 dated 21st June, 1933, (Received 24th June, 1933).

On the morning of June 19th, 1933, Major Thomson had an informal talk regarding Land Settlement with the officers and other ranks of the company of Assyrian Levies stationed at Mosul. He explained to them the government policy and what he had come out to do. He then asked anyone who wished to put any question to him.

One of the Levy officers then got up and said that they could not discuss Land Settlement because they had given an undertaking to take no part in politics. Major Thomson then pointed out that Land Settlement could hardly be described as being a political question. The senior (Assyrian) Levy Officer then said that they could do nothing until they had obtained instructions from the Mar Shimun.

I understand that the Mar Shimun promised last summer that he would have nothing at all to do with the Levies in future.

I must state here that I am by no means easy in my mind in regard to the position of the Levies in Mosul. I will later deal with this question more fully.

NUMBER 47.

Reference my S/200 of 21st June, 1933.

(1) Latest indications are that Yaku will refuse to come in unless he has been told to do so by the Mar Shimun. I suggest, therefore, that the Mar Shimun should be induced to write to him to tell him to do so. The Mar Shimun would probably do this if he is told that the Government fully intends to bring in Yaku, by force if necessary, and if the truly appalling results of a conflict between Yaku’s followers and the forces of the Government are explained to him, for which results he will himself (the Mar Shimun) be responsible more than any single individual.

(2) In the meantime I have recommended to the Mutasarrif that he should take no hasty measures, however justified these may appear to be.

I further advised:

(1) That an order be issued that throughout the Liwa gatherings of more than 5 armed men or travelling in parties of more than 5 armed men are forbidden. This order will apply equally to Arabs, Kurds and Assyrians.

(2) That if Yaku definitely refuses to come in, a Police Inspector with two or three men should go to the village where Yaku is staying and inform him that as he has refused to go in to Dohuk, they have come to escort him there. The Inspector will further say to Yaku that he himself has been instructed not to employ force (which, of course, would have been out of the question) but he should warn him that the Government will now take whatever steps it considered necessary to effect his arrest.

(3) If in the last resort it becomes necessary to employ force notices should be sent to all Assyrian villages saying that the Government has been compelled to take action against Yaku who has disobeyed its orders. This action is in no way directed against Assyrians as a whole nor against the spiritual head of the Nestorian Church, the Mar Shimun.

(4) In the case of action against Yaku, notices should be sent to all Kurdish leaders in the neighbourhood and to the Mukhtars of Kurdish villages that they are personally responsible for keeping their followers within the boundaries of their villages.
Administrative Inspector, Mosul, to Adviser, Ministry of Interior, No. S/208 dated 22nd June, 1933, (Received 24th June, 1933).

1. Yaku has not yet come in. Yesterday it was arranged that as Yaku expressed his distrust of Qaimmaqam Dohuk (Note: I consider that Yaku is entirely wrong in considering that this Qaimmaqam is prejudiced against him) the Qaimmaqam of Amadia should go to Suwara Tuka this morning at 8 a.m. to meet Yaku. Yaku at first said he would meet him if a car was sent for him. A car was, therefore, sent but Yaku changed his mind and refused to come. He gave as an excuse that his followers would not allow him to do so.

2. I forward, herewith, translation of a letter addressed by Yaku to the Qaimmaqam Amadia. This letter was dictated by Yaku to a head-constable, named Jerjis who is an Assyrian. The tone of this letter is objectionable.

3. I also forward herewith translation of a Madhbata* submitted to the Mutasarrif by various leaders of the opposition party.

4. I was present this morning at an interview between Daud Eff. (Mar Shimun’s father) and the Mutasarrif and the Director General of Police. Mr. Panfil acted as interpreter.

The Mutasarrif and the Director General were both most conciliatory. They promised that if Yaku wished to leave Iraq territory, they would afford him every facility. They stated clearly that the Government was most adverse to using force but was determined to bring in Yaku by force if he refused to come in of his own accord. They pointed out that Yaku, himself would be responsible for any tragic results which followed the use of force. This responsibility would be shared by those Assyrian leaders who refused to advise Yaku to obey the Government orders. Finally Daud Eff. agreed to do his best in the matter.

5. No immediate action is being taken but considerable police reinforcements are being brought into the Liwa. The Police Posts at Gorigawan and Suwara Tuka are being reinforced.

6. The order which I recommended in para 2—1 of my S/205 of June 21st, 1933, has been issued. Arrangements have also been made for the printing of the notice which I recommended in para 2—3 of the same letter.

7. It is to be hoped that Yaku will come in soon, since all reports show that there is increasing excitement among the Kurds in the neighbourhood. I am however, afraid that persuasion will be of no avail. All that can be done then will be to endeavour to limit the area of operations.

Enclosure to 48.
Terms of Yaku, dictated to the head-constable Jerjis of Suwara Tuka Post, (Translation).

1. He (Yaku) will not go to Dohuk or Simel, because if he went there his men numbering 200 armed would follow him; he therefore does not wish to affect his reputation by such a gathering.

2. He will keep the peace and if Werda Bonadan was released, he would withdraw his armed men from the road.

3. He is still obedient to Mar Shimun’s orders whether he is in Iraq or elsewhere.

4. Malik Khoshaa and his followers are traitors, because they disobeyed the orders of the Mar Shimun; he himself is loyal to Government and more benefit would be derived from him than from those traitors.

5. Qaimmaqam Dohuk affected him by restricting the liberty of some of his followers by false reasons, like his imprisoning Werda for saying to Chiko “I’ll kill you”; it was clear that his imprisonment by Qaimmaqam Dohuk was directed merely against Yaku.

* No. 44.
6. He executes the orders of the Government; if any offence were to be committed by any of his men, he would arrest the accused and hand him to Government.

7. Qaimmaqam Dohuk affected his reputation twice when he went to Dohuk, once to meet him and the second time to meet Major Thomson by his orders. On the first time there were with him 8 men and on the second 10. Qaimmaqam Dohuk informed the Mutasarrif that there were with him 50 mounted men the first time and 70 the second time, and that without any enquiry being made but solely on the statement of mischief makers.

8. He will preserve tranquility in order to safeguard his prestige, his name and his services up till now, and in order not to have his status fall.

9. He requests Government not to listen to mischief makers or to restrict the liberty of his followers, which only increases the anger in his heart and in the hearts of his men; on the contrary Government should be considerate with them in order that they may serve it.

10. The Government had given them liberty. If any of its officials assaulted them on his own account they would also do the same to him; and they would not regard that as a crime as they are free.

11. After the return of Mar Shimun and his decision to stay in 'Iraq permanently, then the Qaimmaqam of Dohuk will see his real fidelity.

Remarks.—

After Yaku had signed this paper, he informed the head-constable that he would oppose the Government like a "Cat" if the Government wished to put him down.

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Number 49.


We forward herewith copies of three telegrams received from the Mutasarrif of Mosul at Dohuk, and the Director General of Police, indicating how serious the situation created by the Assyrians under the leadership of Yaku bin Malik Ismail has become.

In view of the danger of a disturbance of the peace we consider it essential to take precautions against all eventualities and to ensure the suppression of the movement in the shortest time with complete success in its initial stages and before it has spread.

Therefore you are requested to study the position and to arrange for a sufficient military force to be despatched as early as possible to be ready for eventualities in that area, and to intimate the result to us.

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Number 50.


I append below a letter addressed to you which I have received from Yaku bin Malik Ismail in response to my request for an undertaking for good behaviour, as dictated to you this morning.

Beginns:

"With regard to the false allegations against me made by Qaimmaqam, Dohuk, his threatening me and his distribution of rifles to Kurdish tribes and peoples to rise against us, our past experience shows that the present Government believe everything which the Qaimmaqam may state. As a proof you despatched the Army against us. The Government also accuses us, and now I personally give this document to the effect that I myself had no bad intention towards any Government when the people gathered. I saw the Government forces concentrating and now I undertake that I shall not do anything evil if not compelled by the Government to do so. I will disband
my men if the Government withdraws its forces and reduces them to their previous number. I am ready at any time to interview the Government officials near the four villages inhabited by my tribe. As regards the settlement question, I am at liberty to hear and mediate between the Government and my tribe. Our community should not be forced to accept chiefs whom it dislike. To fulfil this undertaking I am ready to pay a cash security. Copies to Mutasarrif Mosul, Qaimmaqam Dohuk and Mar Shimun. Ends.

The statement about the arming of Kurds, threats and oppression is absolutely unfounded as the Ministry is aware. The report of Qaimmaqam, Amadia, on his interview with Yaku is briefly that the latter refused absolutely to disperse his force unless the Government first withdrew the additional force from the posts, and persisted in his mutinous refusal to obey any order other than that of Mar Shimun. His sole demand was that Government should accept Mar Shimun as the official leader of the Assyrians and comply with his proposals on the Assyrian question. Yaku and his followers are fortified on the summits commanding the car-road between Gorigawan and Bageira. Details posted.

Number 51.

Minister of Interior to Mar Shimun No. C/1273
24th June, 1933. (Translation).

I confirm my answer given to you by telephone on Thursday that I do not wish you to leave Baghdad for the present, pending further intimation.

Number 52.


Your secret memorandum No. S/1282 of 24th June, 1933.

1. Orders have been issued that a force shall concentrate at Dohuk composed as follows:
   - One Squadron Cavalry,
   - One Mountain Battery,
   - Three Battalions Infantry.

2. The first units of the above mentioned force have started to move on their way to Dohuk. The duty of the force is at present confined to concentration and readiness for events.

Number 53.


Minister wishes you to see Yaku as soon as possible if you see no objection and endeavour to persuade him to come in quietly. You are authorised to inform him that Government does not yet consider him criminal but his recent actions have been such that they require explanation. He is required to come into Mosul to make those explanations. If reasonable they will be accepted on grounds that misunderstanding has occurred. He will however be required to give with suitable guarantee an undertaking for good behaviour in future and that he will not go about with large armed parties.

Number 54.

Administrative Inspector, Mosul, to Adviser, Ministry of Interior, No. S/210 dated 25th June, 1933, (Received 27th June, 1933)

Further to my S/208 of June 22, 1933.

1. Yesterday (June 24) I proceeded to Dohuk and spent the day there. I had long conferences with the Mutasarrif and Director General of Police and obtained an indication of the latest development in regard to Yaku bin Malik Ismail. He has not yet come in and shows little sign of doing so.
2. On Friday June 23, Mr. Panfil took a letter from Daud Eff. (Mar Shimun's father) to Yaku. He met him just outside of Bageira village. He had a long conversation with Yaku but the results were unsatisfactory. Later Mr. Panfil went to Suwara Tuka and met the Qaimmaqam Amadia, Majid Beg, there. He then returned to Bageira with Majid Beg and again met Yaku, further long conversations taking place.

Yaku was asked to sign an undertaking that he would be obedient to Government orders but refused to do so. He insisted that the following conditions should be inserted.

1. That he (Yaku) should be free to go to the villages and treat with his people in regard to their settlement.

2. That the Government should order the police to retire.
   (Note.—This presumably refers to the reinforcements sent to Gorigavan and Suwara Tuka).

3. That the Qaimmaqam of Dohuk and Doctor Baba should be punished for spreading false news and giving false reports to the Government.
   (Note.—Dr Baba was until lately Government Doctor at Dohuk and is now in Mosul. He is an Assyrian and belongs to the anti Mar Shimun party).

These conditions, naturally, were unacceptable, Yaku said that he was not prepared to disperse his men until the Police reinforcements retired.

In view of this it appeared that there was but little hope of Yaku now coming in of his own accord. The Mutasarrif after consultation with the Director General of Police who was also in Dohuk telegraphed early on the morning of June 24th that in order to deal with the situation a large force is required. I agree with this for the following reasons:

1. A large show of force would probably prevent a number of waverers joining Yaku. As it is the Assyrian villagers in the neighbourhood appear to be divided. It is probable that Yaku is using threats as well as persuasion to induce villagers to join him. These will have less weight if a very powerful Government force is shown.

2. A check, even of a partial nature, suffered by the Government might have the most serious results and the trouble would spread.

3. In this way the employment of a large force would be the most human measure possible as it might at least prevent any resistance or at least localise the conflict.

3. On the morning of June 24th Mr. Panfil took another letter to Yaku asking him to sign an undertaking that he would (1) disperse his forces (2) come in when ordered by the Government.

He refused and gave to Mr. Panfil a counter-manifesto, a translation of which I attach herewith. The demands contained therein are, of course, entirely unacceptable.

4. It is at present difficult to say how many followers Yaku has. He has his personal following which apparently consists of about 30. A considerable number of these are ex-Levies. The real question is how many villagers he could count on. The four Assyrian villages in the Gorigavan district which have been so far most affected by his propaganda could collect about 200 rifles. Most of the men from these villages—Bageira, Sufla, Bageira Ulia, Gundik and Kavlasin are reported already to have left their villages and taken to the hills. But, of course, it is by no means certain that all these would join him in a conflict with Government forces, whatever were the circumstances of the case. A number of other armed men might come in from villages further off.

Here it should be noted that every day that the Government delays action will result in an increase in Yaku's strength, as it is certain that he is sending word to other villages for assistance.

In view of the difficult nature of the country with which the Assyrians of the Upper Tiyari and Tkhuma tribes are thoroughly familiar, a batta-
lion of Iraq Army even if supported by a large Police force would in time risk a reverse. And this must be avoided at all costs. Therefore a really large force is required if any fighting has to be done.

5. It is still, however, to be hoped that fighting on anything like a considerable scale will be avoided. The object of concentrating a large force is largely, as stated above, to overawe any possible opposition owing to the obvious hopelessness of resistance and to prevent doubtful villages joining.

There is however, another method of preventing villagers from joining, which must be employed. This is the use of propaganda. The Assyrian villagers must be persuaded that the Government intends no harm whatever to Assyrians as a whole. The operations are directed against one man only.

The Mutasarrif has, on June 24, interviewed in Dohuk some Mukhtars of Assyrians villages notably Bageira Suflu, Bageira Ulia, Majal Makht, Kavlasin, and explained the position. These mukhtars have now returned to their villages and have promised to do their best. As many more as possible should be seen. A lot of good may result from the personal touch.

6. Reports have been current for some time that letters have been sent to Yaku telling him to maintain his present attitude, as this is the only means of forcing the Government to permit Mar Shimun to return to Mosul and to grant him his full rights. I consider it probable that these reports are in part at least true.

7. In conclusion I must lay it down as my considered opinion that greatly as I regret the necessity for the use of force, I do not now see any alternative if Yaku finally refuses to come in. If the Government shows weakness this time or accept any compromise, the present crisis will be repeated. It appears, therefore, essential to force the position now. It is sincerely to be hoped that there will be no bloodshed. I consider that the methods proposed are most likely to attain this end.

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Enclosure to 54.

Yaku's Manifesto.

1. I give this document that my work and movements will be as blameless in future as they have been in the past unless I am forced by false reports, like this time.

2. I will obey all the orders and regulations of the Government and the orders of the officials, provided that such orders and regulations are not against the benefit of my Nation and that the officials are not cruel.

3. As soon as a decision is reached between H.B. Mar Shimun and the Government regarding the demands of the Assyrians who are pressing Mar Shimun for them, then I am ready to interview Government officials not only in Mosul but also in Baghdad.

4. I will order my men to go as soon as the Government forces are withdrawn.

5. Rev. Panfil is guaranteeing all that I have said in this document.

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Number 55.

Administrative Inspector, Mosul to Adviser, Ministry of Interior

No. S/213 of 27th June, 1933.

According to the instructions of His Excellency the Minister as conveyed in your telegram C/1288 of June 25th, 1933, I proceeded to Dohuk on the morning of June 26th. There I met Major Thomson, who had just arrived from Amadiya. I told him that I was on my way to meet Yaku and invited him to accompany me, as I thought that his presence might be of assistance to me. He agreed and in fact I owe much to him in the successful result of my conversations
with Yaku. My confidential clerk, Yusuf Eff. Nanoo, acted as interpreter in a very capable manner. The subject was too important to allow misunderstandings and Yaku's knowledge of English is limited.

I met Yaku by arrangement just below Bageira village at 11.30 a.m. Conversation lasted about two hours, when Yaku agreed to come in with me to Mosul. We then had lunch and left at 2 p.m. arriving at Mosul at 5 p.m.

The following is a brief précis of the conversations:

I commenced by telling Yaku that a position fraught with the most terrible possibilities had been reached, and that this was due to his not having obeyed the instructions of the Government to come in to Dohuk.

I then informed him of the conditions under which he could still make submission—these conditions being those laid down in your telegram—telling him that I was prepared to take him direct to Mosul in my own car. Yaku did not answer me immediately but commenced to talk about Assyrian Land Settlement with Major Thomson. He then asked me if I was prepared to hear his account of the recent happenings. I said I was, and he commenced a long series of complaints against the Qaimmaqam of Dohuk. I several times interrupted him to ask him why he had not complained to the Mutassarif or the Administrative Inspector in Mosul. As regards the Qaimmaqam I said that he may or may not have been correct in his opinion of the recent activities of Yaku but I knew that he was a convinced well wisher of the Assyrians.

Yaku then said that he had committed no crime against the Government. I replied that the Government did not as yet consider him as being a criminal, but had repeatedly told him to report to Dohuk—or if he objected to that—to Mosul direct. I pointed out to him that he had not done so and that if he remained obstinate the Government would be compelled to bring him in by force. Otherwise the Government would cease to function as such. As an ex-Officer he must understand that. He then said that he had no intention of resisting the Government and had in fact that day told most of his men to disperse. I asked him if an inspector with two men came to arrest him, he would resist him or not. He did not reply. He then asked that the Government should withdraw the police reinforcements which had been sent to the posts of Gorigavan and Suwara Tuka. I replied that the Government had taken such steps as it considered necessary to maintain public security and that it was quite out of the question that it should be dictated to by a private individual.

Yaku then began to express doubts as to the sincerity of the Government statement that nothing would be done to him if he came in to Mosul. I then showed him your telegram, which I think convinced him finally. He said, however, that his followers were very much afraid for his safety, as reports had been spread about that he would be hanged immediately he came to Mosul. I told him that this was absurd and that he had the word of the Minister of Interior to give the lie to such false reports.

After a little more talk, he said that he would come in with me.

As regards my impressions of Yaku—I am convinced that the principal reason for his not coming in was a genuine fear of the treatment which he would receive. He may have been—and very possibly was—urged by certain people in Mosul to stay out. I am, also, convinced that the Minister's instructions for me to see him came at the psychological moment. He had heard of the arrival of the 'Iraq Army troops at Dohuk and must have realised that the Government intended to have its orders carried out. I impressed this on him. As a soldier he must have known that resistance must in the end be useless. I was prepared to use this argument myself but did not need to do so. Generally I found Yaku a good deal more sensible and receptive to argument than several other Assyrians whom I have met in the last week. Conversations with him this morning have confirmed this view and I am confident that if he is properly handled the Government can make use of him. But he was suspicious, mainly because he knew little or nothing of the 'Iraq Government or its officials. This was, of course, his own fault.
I have this morning, as have the Mutasarrif and the Director-General of Police, endeavoured to remove the suspicion in his mind that the 'Iraq Government does not mean well to the Assyrians.

I hope and indeed I think that we have been largely successful.

When Yaku told his followers (I saw about 20 of them some of whom belonged to the neighbouring villages) that he was leaving, they showed considerable suspicion but these suspicions I was able to calm. They asked me whether the 'Iraq Army would now be withdrawn. I said that once the matter was settled, there would be no need for them. The Director-General of Police, however, told me this morning that the Ministry of Defence wished to seize the opportunity— and thus save loss of money—of carrying out some mountain warfare exercises. I told this to Yaku, and asked him to write to the villagers. He said that he would do so. I also told him that the police reinforcements would remain at Gorigavan and Suwara Tuka until their rations were finished.

As to the policy to be now adopted, I will deal with this in a special report.

Number 56.

Khoshaba Yusif, Chief of the Lower Tiyari to Minister of Interior, dated 28th June, 1933, (Telegram—Translation).

We are informed that Yaku Malik Ismail was taken to Mosul and released without being interrogated as to his latest movement carried out in Dohuk Qadha. You informed us that the Government was taking necessary action against him for collecting a gathering on our way with the intention of an attempt on our life and disturbing the peace in these districts. Please arrange for Yaku to be delivered to justice, otherwise you will keep all loyal subjects suspicious and disturbed.

Number 57.


Notify Malik Khoshaba’s party that they must disband and you should afford no opportunity for such gatherings to be made by either party.

Number 58.


In order to dispel existing doubts and suspicions I strongly recommend and Mutasarrif agrees that he should as soon as possible summon a meeting at Mosul of all Assyrian leaders in order to explain to them officially present position and Government’s policy in regard to Assyrians. Detailed recommendations follow in post.

Number 59.

Mar Shimun to the Minister of Interior No. Nil dated 28th June, 1933, (Received 1st July, 1933).

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter No. C/1239 of 18th June, 1933.

I understand from my conversations with Mr. Edmonds that the references to history in my letter of 3rd June, 1933, have created an impression different from that which I wished to convey. I was not, of course, claiming temporal power in the sense of temporal power delegated to me by the Governments named but was referring to the traditional customs of the Assyrians which I desire to see maintained.

If Your Excellency agrees to this will you kindly instruct the authorities concerned.
As regards the work of Major Thomson I am of course anxious to see, it crowned with success and will do my best to co-operate if the work of settlement is carried out in a manner which, in my opinion, promises satisfactory results. My ideas on this subject are set forth in my correspondence with Sir Kinahan Cornwallis.

With assurances of my loyalty to H.M. the King and my respects to Your Excellency.

NUMBER 60.

Ministry of Interior to Mar Shimun, No. 8/1339 dated 1st July, 1933, (Translation).

This Ministry has ignored your letter of the 28th June, 1933. For information.

NUMBER 61.

Mar Shimun to Ministry of Interior No. Nil of 29th June, 1933, Received 1st July, 1933.

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

I beg to state that the action of the Government now confirmed by your letter No. B/1273 of June 24th, detaining me in Baghdad against my will for no just cause, is illegal; and that any responsibility of what may happen, when the news reaches my people rests with the Government.

I also wish to point out, that the methods adopted by the local officials in dealing with the Assyrian Settlement Policy is contrary to the "Fundamental Law" or the Guarantee given by the 'Iraq Government to the League of Nations on May 30th, 1932. Therefore I am arranging to place the documentary evidence before the proper authorities.

I am quite prepared to suffer any further injustice that the Government may put on me, but in no way will I submit to the methods which have been used to make me sign documents which betray my people into accepting an unreal fulfilment of the promises and recommendations of the League of Nations.

Finally I again repeat, as per my previous correspondence with your Excellency, and also through your British Advisers:

(a) I am willing to assist in the settlement of Assyrians in 'Iraq.

(b) After settlement I will give the required promises in writing to do my best to make my Assyrian people one of the most loyal and law-abiding subjects of His Majesty and His Government.

(c) I will then make preparations in accordance with the Canons of my Church, for drafting of a Law according to your Excellency's suggestion and conformable to Article VI of the Fundamental Law.

If this is not agreeable to the Government, I claim the right to ask the League of Nations for the alternative settlement scheme.

Copies sent to the Diplomatic Representatives of:—

Britain.
America.
Italy.
Poland.
Turkey.
Holland.
France.
Germany.
Belgium.
Norway.
Tchécoslovaquie.
Persia.
P.S. May I draw your Excellency’s attention to the inflammatory speech of an honorary Deputy recorded and broadcasted in Al-Istiklal of 29.6.33, and other local papers inciting hatred towards the Assyrians.

NUMBER 62.

Translation.

I the undersigned Yaku bin Malik Ismail have given this undertaking, ordered to be taken from me under Article 43 of T.C. and C.D.R. against a security of I.D. 200 and declare and guarantee the validity of this for one year under the following conditions:

1. I undertake to behave well preserve the law and order and not spread ideas harmful to the Government interests among the Upper Tiyari tribe or any other.

2. To obey all Government orders and regulations and respect all lawful orders given by me by all the Government officials.

3. To present myself when demanded by the Mutasarrif of the Liwa or by any ‘Iraq Government authority.

4. Not to gather after now armed or unarmed persons from my tribe for unlawful purpose and without reasons acceptable from the legal point of view.

Sgd. Malik Yaku bin Malik Ismail,
Chief of Upper Tiyari,
resident in Simel village (Dohuk).

I guarantee Yaku Eff. son of Malik Ismail for his complying with this undertaking of his and undertake to pay the security estimated in the undertaking of (200) when the said Yaku breaks any of the conditions of the said undertaking.

Mosul, Sgd. Dean John Panfil,
Dater 5th July, 1933. of Jobat ‘Agaidat quarter, Mosul.

NUMBER 63.

Administrative Inspector, Mosul to Adviser, Ministry of Interior No. S/236 of 11th July, 1933 received on 13th July, 1933.

1. The meeting of the Assyrian leaders was duly held on July 10th. All those who had been asked to attend did so. Unfortunately some persons from Mosul town who had not been invited also came and the wild speeches of two or three of these irresponsible young men in the end effectively marred the harmony of the proceedings.

2. The meeting was opened by the acting Mutasarrif reading out a detailed statement of the Government’s policy. Major Thomson and myself were then asked by the acting Mutasarrif to make some remarks. I attach to this report copies of the statements which we made. After this the acting Mutasarrif invited anyone of those present—who were over a hundred in number—to ask questions. Many seized the opportunity. The views expressed were sharply contrasted. A number of speakers said clearly that they were in complete sympathy with the policy of the Government. Two or three others regretted the absence of the Mar Shimun. Unfortunately an inflammatory speech by a certain Ishu Kalaita, a young man who had come uninvited, caused some excitement, and members of the pro and anti-Mar Shimun party com-
menced abusing each other. Feeling remained rather strained until the meeting was adjourned at 1.30 p.m. It had opened at 10 a.m. It was arranged that the meeting should be continued at 10 a.m. the next day.

3. About 9.30 p.m. I received a petition with a large number of signatures (a translation of which I attach herewith). As this was written in Syriac I was unable to read it, but I had a good idea of what it contained, as there had been rumours current during the evening that the pro-Mar Shimun party intended to refuse to attend the next day’s meeting. When I had the petition translated early the next morning this proved to be the case.

I discussed the position with the acting Mutasarrif and he decided to send for four of the most prominent persons who had signed this petition. Two of them came and after some conversation they stated that the signatories of the petition were prepared to attend the conference apart from the other party. They gave as a reason that they feared there would be trouble if the two parties met together. In view of the feeling at the termination of the meeting of the previous day, there were some grounds for these fears. It was, therefore, arranged that there should be two meetings, the first of the anti-Mar Shimun party at 10 a.m. and the second of the pro-Mar Shimun party at 11 a.m.

4. There is nothing to note in connection with the first meeting. All present (about 40 in number) expressed their complete satisfaction with the Government policy, their loyalty to His Majesty the King and their obedience to the Government. The meeting ended with cheers for His Majesty, the Government and the Army.

5. The second meeting lasted from 11 a.m. to 1.30 P.M. The atmosphere was, in the absence of the opposition, far calmer than the previous day. At first most of the speakers dwelt on the difficulties which they had experienced on their lands. It was clear that they were genuinely worried over lack of security of tenure on privately owned lands. Nearly all the speakers said that the presence of the Mar Shimun was absolutely necessary if a satisfactory settlement was to be made. It was explained to them that the Mar Shimun was free to return immediately he signed the simple acknowledgment required from him by His Excellency the Minister of Interior. The draft of this reply was translated to them. (The Director-General of Administration had telephoned to the Acting Mutasarrif that he wished this done). At the same time it was pointed out that the Government was inflexible in its determination not to allow any temporal powers to the Mar Shimun. To sum up the results of this meeting:

Those present acknowledged that they fully understood the policy of the Government, they undertook as long as they were in Iraq to obey all the laws and orders of the Government. They retained, however, the right to consult the Mar Shimun as to whether they should remain in Iraq or leave. (The Commandant of Police explained that anyone who wished to leave Iraq could have a “laissez-passer” at once. The difficulty lay not in this but in obtaining a permit to enter any other country). It had been pointed out to them that the Government was not compelling anyone to apply for settlement or to leave Iraq. All that was required was complete obedience to the laws of the land as long as they remained in Iraq.

6. After the meeting ended, the Acting Mutasarrif asked Mar Yusuf (a Bishop from Batas and uncle of the Mar Shimun), Malik Andreus of the Jilu, Malik Luko of the Tkhuma and Yacoub son of Malik Ismail of the Upper Tiyari to remain behind. He unofficially suggested to them that they should go to Baghdad to see the Mar Shimun and try to induce him to see reason. It was clearly pointed out to them that this advice was given purely in the interests of the Assyrians themselves. The Government had decided on its policy both as regards the position of the Mar Shimun and as regards the settlement of the Assyrians. This policy would be carried out whether the Mar Shimun was in Baghdad, Mosul or elsewhere. At the same time it appeared that a certain number of Assyrians would not apply for land settlement until advised to do so by the Mar Shimun. These would suffer irreparable harm. The Government would not be harmed at all. Finally they said that they would
think the matter over and possibly two of them would take a letter to the Mar Shimun in Baghdad.

7. On the whole I consider that considerable benefits have been obtained from the meeting. It may not have greatly influenced—at any rate for the moment—the loyalties of those Assyrians who still follow the Mar Shimun. But at any rate they do now understand beyond any possible doubt the policy of the Government. They did not understand this before, nor did they knew of the final decisions of the League of Nations.

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Enclosure 1 to 63.

*Acting Mutasarrif, Khalil Azmi Beg’s speech.*

I would not have wished to summon you from your homes at this time and to cause you to suffer from travelling in summer had there not been an object of great importance, relating to your interests even more than to the interests of the State. I have to thank you for your attendance at the hour fixed for the meeting.

**Reasons for holding this meeting:**

The reason for holding this meeting is the earnest desire of the Government to remove the beliefs which some of the Assyrians entertain contrary to the real facts, whether such beliefs were born in their minds directly, or through harmful propaganda. Therefore I say:

1. The signs of a misunderstanding between a section of the Assyrian refugees and the Government authorities did not cease in the past and if the reasons are carefully followed and the main factors which have complicated that misunderstanding examined, it would soon appear to us that that a section of Assyrians were the cause, since everybody knows that they have until now been standing aloof and far from an understanding with the Government. As far as I understand, the reason for this isolation is that they are still not assured of their real intention to reside in ‘Iraq (as they still consider themselves to be refugees). Is it within possibility to obtain a special status like autonomy? This is impossible to attain. But owing to the final decision passed by the League of Nations (which will be read out to you to-day and of which printed copies will be distributed), and in view of the position of the neighbouring States and their clear attitude towards any Assyrian migration, the actual position has become quite different from what they imagine. They will come to know in this meeting the announcements made by those States in respect of Assyrian migration to their countries. Be fully assured that the ‘Iraqi Government under the Sovereignty of His Majesty King Faisal the First are still bearing good will towards you and that they have lost no time restoring confidence and ensuring your future prospects. The Government intends to profit by your presence, should you settle in its country and become its loyal subjects. It has determined to accord to you the same treatment as other ‘Iraqis from whom the Kingdom of ‘Iraq is constituted, and also intends to grant you in that case the same privileges. In the meantime, it expects you to be loyal and conform to the laws in force.

3. The ‘Iraqi Government was aware of the demands submitted to the League of Nations by Mar Shimun; the Government opposed the acceptance of such demands, knowing that they were inconsistent with its sovereignty on the one hand, and did not conform to the requirements of administration on the other. This opposition resulted in the League of Nations rejecting those demands, whose decision will be read out to you in Syriac. It will appear to you from this decision that the League of Nations rejected the demands of Assyrians for a special administration and autonomy also, and was satisfied with the guarantee which was given by the ‘Iraqi Government that it would endeavour to effect settlement
of landless persons who actually require settlement, and that it would afford all facilities to those desirous of leaving 'Iraq for other countries.

The 'Iraq Government has also promised that it will employ in Government posts suitable persons in the same manner as the Arabs and Kurds are employed; but in certain cases this will be impossible owing to their ignorance of Kurdish or Arabic.

As regards the question of land settlement, before discussing it I should like to let you know the attitude of the three neighbouring States and their expressions in the event of Assyrians wishing to emigrate to other countries. I will request the Administrative Inspector, Mr. Stafford, to kindly give you explanations from which it will appear that there is no hope for Assyrians in the neighbouring countries; and it cannot be said that there is any hope elsewhere, owing to the financial depression prevailing in the whole world.

4. Here I would revert to the land settlement question. The 'Iraq Government promised to recruit a foreign expert to assist in this. It has fulfilled its promise and Major Thomson has been here for over a month. I have requested him to explain to you at this meeting his policy and programme, also what has appeared to him regarding the condition of lands and villages.

5. Government Policy.—

This is what the 'Iraqi Government can do for the Assyrians in respect of treatment and settlement. The Assyrians should conform to the laws of the country, as the Government cannot permit people in its country to violate its laws and regulations, which are applied to all its nationals. The long patience of the Government towards some of the Assyrians of fractious temperament and the leniency shown to them, despite their deviation from the lawful path, is only founded on feelings of humanity towards parties of refugees who have settled in its country. But this does not mean that the Government will remain lenient further, since those ungrateful persons who continue misleading do not deserve to receive good. This is not only its own point of view, but also that of any other nation.

The administrative officials will deal with Assyrians in the same manner as Arabs and Kurds, mainly through the Mukhtars of villages. The Maliks are similar to the Arab Shaikhs and Kurdish Chiefs. The title of an Arab Shaikh and Kurdish Tribal Chief is an honorary one and has no special privileges from the Government, as such title is not regarded by the Government as an official appointment. It makes no difference to the Government if many people in the south describe themselves as Shaikhs (since, according to tribal customs, every member of the Shaikh's family has the right to call himself a Shaikh), but the Government does not undertake the appointment of a Shaikh.

6. Complaints have recently been received by the police that there has been a great falling off in the registration of rifles in possession of Assyrians. The Assyrians, therefore, should register their rifles in the same way as the Kurds and Arabs register their rifles. The ultimate policy of the 'Iraq Government is to minimise the number of rifles in possession of tribes throughout 'Iraq; when the time comes for the execution of this policy the Assyrians would be required to surrender a number of their rifles at the same time as the Arabs and Kurds do so.

7. Everybody should come to understand that the 'Iraq Government is anxious for the execution of its orders and that, like other civilised States, it is not desirous of shedding blood; but it will take all possible steps, when necessary, to maintain its authority.

The Government intended during last month to take effective measures against Malik Yaku Ismail and his followers, when he refused to obey orders to appear before the Dohuk authority. Such action would have been similar
to that carried out by the Government against Shaikh Ahmad of Barzan had his case not been satisfactorily settled; but it should be understood for the last time that the repetition by him of such behaviour is not permissible.

8. It is in the interest of Assyrians who decide to reside in Iraq to obtain nationality certificates, for the 'Iraq Government cannot allot lands to those who do not consider themselves Iraqis; such people cannot expect to attain private or Government positions without it.

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ENCLOSURE II TO 63.


It appears to me that the acting Mutassarif has said almost all that there is to be said about this question. I have only a few remarks to make.

I came to this Liwa less than two months ago, having previously worked in Southern 'Iraq, where only faint echoes are heard of the Assyrian question. Since I have been in Mosul, I have been almost constantly employed in dealing with it. What has impressed me most has been the lack of contact between Assyrians and the Government officials. The result has been misunderstanding and suspicion. I cannot help agreeing with the Acting Mutassarif that this lack of contact has largely been the fault of the Assyrians themselves. They appear until quite recently to have considered themselves as being foreigners living in a strange land and to have adopted the view that the less they had to do with the Government the better. This attitude has naturally displeased officials.

I want all you Assyrian Leaders who are present to-day to realise once and for all that this is an intolerable situation and one which must end. Assyrians must either recognise that they are 'Iraqi citizens enjoying the same rights and obeying the same laws as other inhabitants of the countries, whether they be Kurd or Arab, Muslim, Christian or Jew, or they must be prepared to leave the country. There is no middle path. Major Thomson will shortly explain to you the details of the proposed Land Settlement. I, therefore, need not say anything. But I must emphasise that this is the last—absolutely the last—opportunity which will be afforded to landless Assyrians of obtaining any lands or cultivating rights in this country.

Anyone who persuade landless Assyrians not to apply for settlement is doing them irreparable harm.

As regards the second alternative which I have mentioned, that of leaving 'Iraq. I do not think that all Assyrians quite understand the position. The 'Iraq Government has undertaken to grant every facility to those Assyrians who wish to leave 'Iraq. That is to say that no one who wishes to go will be prevented from so doing. But the 'Iraq Government is in no way responsible for finding a place outside 'Iraq for Assyrians to go to. It obviously could not do so. Nor has the League of Nations, for its part promised to find such lands outside 'Iraq. It is up to Assyrians themselves to make such arrangements, both as regards to obtaining approval from the Government of the country in which they wish to settle and as regards the expenses of transport. So far nothing has been done towards obtaining such approval from any Government. Nor is it in any way likely that any country will be prepared to accept immigration of Assyrians on a large scale. In regard to the neighbouring countries: (1) Turkey. There is not the slightest chance of the Turkish Government modifying its present attitude towards Assyrians. It will not accept them at any price. It is natural that Assyrians should desire to regain their old homes, but it must be understood that this is quite out of the question under existing circumstances. (2) Persia. The Persian Government has said that it would accept small groups of Assyrians but the conditions offered are hard—(i) all arms to be surrendered, (ii) settlement not to be in one place but in very widely separated places, (iii) no rights in the land to be given (iv) no financial assistance to be given. (3) Syria. As you are aware the French authorities in Syria already have the problem of the Armenian refugees. They have no-
land to offer Assyrians. It is true that young Assyrians might be able to obtain employment in the French Colonial armies, but let me tell you that such service is hard in the extreme. Nor would there be any future for such men in Syria, while the 'Iraq Government would naturally be unwilling to allow their return to 'Iraq. This is the position in regard to the neighbouring countries, which if you wish you can check here in Mosul by asking the Consuls of France and Persia.

In view of the present economic crisis it is not to be expected that any country in the world would welcome Assyrian immigrants. All countries at present refuse immigration of any kind.

I think that what I have just said will be sufficient to show you that in actual fact the real future of the Assyrians lies in 'Iraq. I know that the 'Iraq Government is genuinely anxious to settle the Assyrian question. This is as much in the interest of the Government as of the Assyrians. I know that all responsible 'Iraqis, whether Ministers or officials, wish to see the Assyrians living as contented 'Iraqi citizens. It is, therefore, the duty of Assyrians to reciprocate. If you do, I can assure you of sympathy and help. But first of all you must get rid of the present spirit of aloofness. If in the past your children had learnt Arabic or Kurdish as well as their own Assyrian language, there would be far more positions in the towns open to them. The Acting Mutasarrif has already mentioned this. Everyone understands and regrets the difficulties and the sufferings of the Assyrians. The 'Iraq Government which is responsible for neither is going to do its best to help. But do not forget that the 'Iraq Government is not long established and that 'Iraq is not yet a rich country. Assyrians cannot expect conditions better than those of Kurds and Arabs. If you wish to flourish, you must be prepared to work hard. For your own sake and for those of your children, I hope that you will all do so.

The acting Mutasarrif has dealt fully with the question of the Mar Shimun. I need only remark that what he has said is self evident truth and one which requires no explanation. In no country in the world are spiritual and temporal powers combined. They cannot be in 'Iraq.

In conclusion I have to say that the time has now arrived for you to decide once and for all whether you are going to stay in 'Iraq or not. In my opinion—and I am earnestly seeking your interests—you cannot do otherwise than stay.

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Enclosure III to 63.

Statement by Major D. B. Thomson.

I welcome this opportunity of meeting so many of the Assyrian leaders some of whom I have had the pleasure of seeing before.

I am going to speak to you very frankly and straightforwardly, as I should be neglecting my duty to all Assyrians if I did not explain the present position correctly and accurately.

I also want you to realize the very great importance of this meeting.

Most of you know what my position is, namely that I have been asked by the 'Iraq Government to advise in the settlement of the Assyrians, in accordance with a promise made by the 'Iraq Government to the League of Nations.

You have heard the conclusions of the Council of the League of Nations which were read to you by the Mutasarrif and I would remind you that when I leave this country, whether the settlement is made or not, I must write a full report of all the facts of the case for the 'Iraq Government, who will send a copy to the League of Nations.

When I saw the Mar Shimun in Baghdad at the beginning of June we discussed the question of settlement at some length. He then definitely refused to help or give me the names of any of the Assyrian leaders in Mosul or elsewhere who advised him, and whom I wished to see. He based his refusal to help, on the fact that he did not agree with the Government's policy for settle-
ment quite forgetting that I had come out here to advise the Government and that the Government's policy would depend on that advice. His other reason for refusal was that he had been asked by the 'Iraq Government to give an assurance that he would not take an active part in the Temporal, that is, administrative control of the Assyrians though the Government fully recognised his rights as Spiritual head to deal with all Ecclesiastical matters.

There has been I fear much confusion and misunderstanding over the word Temporal Power, and I will try and explain their meaning as simply as I can.

The request of the Government merely asks that the Mar Shimun will give an assurance that he does not claim the right to exercise powers similar to those of an Administrative Official of the 'Iraq Government in his dealings with Assyrians.

I cannot believe that the Mar Shimun really wishes to claim the right to do these things.

I explained to him that the demand of the Government was a perfectly normal one to ask from any of its subjects and that nowhere in the world was there a Spiritual head of any religion or community who carried Temporal or Administrative powers in addition to his Spiritual ones.

The Mar Shimun then wrote me a letter promising to send me his reasons for differing with the Government's policy. That was over a month ago and I have not yet received his letter.

Meanwhile nothing is being done to facilitate and expedite the settlement, and the Mar Shimun still disagrees with the Government in Baghdad on the question of his personal position.

I cannot but feel that if the Mar Shimun really understands the decision of the Council of the League of Nations and also the request of the Government for his assurance, and if he truly has the welfare of the Assyrians at heart, that he should subordinate this question of personal status and instruct his leaders and advisers here to co-operate with me in every way possible for a speedy settlement of Assyrians.

The result of the present policy of “wait and see” which has now been going on for some 4 or 5 years has been in my opinion disastrous and can only end by alienating the sympathies of the world in general from the cause of the Assyrian people.

An atmosphere of distrust and suspicion has arisen which is entirely un called for and unjustiﬁed. Many Assyrians have been living on their capital and will soon have none. Had they settled 4 or 5 years ago under the scheme then proposed, they would have had money to build houses, buy cattle &c., and been making an income from their cultivation.

If the leaders consider the presence of the Mar Shimun is essential to the settlement I would beg them to use all their inﬂuence in urging the Mar Shimun to agree to the Government's wishes, and so let him help in the settlement of his people, or instruct his leaders to do so.

It is of first importance, if the settlement is to be carried out, that there should be no further delay, of any kind.

Remember I am here to help the Assyrians with my advice in every way possible, and if my advice is not taken then it will be your concern. Of one thing however you can rest assured that there can be no question of another coming to take my place. This is your last scheme.

Make up your minds once and for all that you must settle in 'Iraq. No other country will offer you the terms and conditions that you are being given by the 'Iraq Government. Decide to make the best of it without further delay.

As regards the method of settlement, I will endeavour in so far as is possible to arrange for the settlement of each village by members of the same tribe.

The Government has asked for the registration of the names of families wishing for land. Very few names have been registered. Naturally when the
time comes for settlement those families who have registered their names will get first preference in the question of land, and those who come late will have to take their chance.

I would therefore urge all those families who wish to cultivate land themselves to register their names without delay.

Those who live in villages which are definitely unhealthy and wish to move will then be considered, when those who have registered and are at present without land are accommodated.

Of course persons in employment in Baghdad or elsewhere who apply for land which they would work by servants or hired labour would not be considered until all the cases of persons who would cultivate themselves have been dealt with.

There are various lands which will be considered for settlement—Dashtazi—Champashi—Gaz Fakhdah; some land near Mosul and also in certain villages.

I would remind you that the Government had voted 13,000 Iraq Dinars towards the settlement for irrigation and development purposes.

I should gladly welcome the views of Assyrian leaders on the possibilities of these various places for settlement. I have personally visited them and believe that they would be suitable.

The question of the acquirement of the rights of ownership in the case of Government land has already been explained to most of you and also the position of tenant and Agha-landlord in the case of privately owned land.

I am always ready to see any Assyrian and explain any point on which there may be difficulty or doubt.

In conclusion I can assure you the ‘Iraq Government wishes to help you in every way possible, and that in Colonel Stafford and myself you have two absolutely fair and impartial persons whose aim is to dispel misunderstandings, bring the Assyrians together again, and settle them happily and contentedly.

I would ask you to put your trust in us and to understand that our one object is to advise and help the Assyrians to the best of our ability in the matter of their settlement in ‘Iraq.

ENCLOSURE IV TO 63.

Madkhata signed by certain Assyrian Chiefs to Munasarrif, Mosul dated 10th July, 1933, (Translation).

We the undersigned beg to lay before your honour the following lines:

We who have been invited by the Government thought that this was solely in connection with the Settlement. Now, therefore, our final statement is that His Beatitude the Mar Shimun is our agent, which representation we have not as yet withdrawn from him. Therefore we are unable to give any word or decision till His Beatitude is present here.

NUMBER 64.

Administrative Inspector, Mosul, to Adviser, Ministry of Interior,

1. I am informed that considerable pressure has been brought to bear on Yaku, Luko and Andreus not to go to Baghdad. They are, however, determined to go. It is reported that they will advise Mar Shimun either to give the required acknowledgment or to give up all hope of remaining in ‘Iraq.

2. Some of the wilder and more unbalanced spirits in Mosul still appear to be talking of leaving ‘Iraq, possibly to Syria and possibly to Turkey. They do not appear to have thought of the reception they are likely to receive. As regards Turkey they appear to think that if they get up to their high mountain villages which are still empty they may be able to resist the Turks. Naturally if this silly project seemed likely to fructify, it will be an act of “bon vioisinage” for the ‘Iraq Government to inform the Turkish authorities.
3. I gather that some of the local Assyrians are objecting to the present settlement on the grounds that the Greek refugees from Turkey were given much financial assistance in Greece and that the same has been the case with the Armenians in Syria. They, therefore, consider that land should be bought and houses built for them. No one except an Assyrian perhaps would expect to obtain conditions better than those enjoyed by the original inhabitants of the country!

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**Number 65.**

*Administrative Inspector, Mosul to Adviser, Ministry of Interior,*

*No. 8/258 of 29th July, 1933 received on 22nd July, 1933.*

Yaku and Luko left Mosul on Friday and it was generally thought that they had gone to Baghdad. See para 6 of my 8/296 of July 11. I had not personally seen either of them since July 11, but Major Thomson had had several interviews with them and they expressed their definite intention of going to Baghdad in order to discuss the whole situation with Mar Shimun. Actually they did not do so. It is as yet uncertain where they did go. One report says that they have gone to Syria. If they did so, they did so without having obtained permits from either the Iraq or French Governments. I have asked the French Consul whether any visas were given, and he replied that none had been or would be issued to Assyrians. The other report is that they proceeded to Dohuk in order to encourage the villagers toward emigration from Iraq. It is reported that a large number of Assyrians have collected near the village of Busirian. It is rumoured that their intention is to make their way to Syria, crossing the Tigris somewhere near Faish-khabur.

I informed the French Consul of this possibility as I considered this was due to him as "bon voisinage". He stated that on no account would the French authorities allow the Assyrians to enter Syria.

It is, of course, possible that their wish to leave Iraq and emigrate to Syria in genuine. It may appear incredible that this is so, but the Assyrians are so stupid that no foolishness is impossible. In this case presumably the Iraq Government will not take any steps against them, provided they do nothing to interfere with public security; but the French authorities will certainly forcibly prevent their entrance into Syria.

It may be considered inadvisable that this should take place, but better that the Iraq Government should stop them before they reach the frontier. In this case I suggest that the two Governments should arrange for a senior French official to come into Iraq and tell the Assyrians that they will not be allowed into Syria.

It is, however, by no means certain that the object of this gathering is emigration. It is possible that the Assyrians, who are mainly Tkhuma, with a few Upper Tiyari, perhaps 200 in all, may be deliberately trailing their cloak in front of the Government. I have in previous reports remarked that a danger existed of the Mar Shimun’s family and immediate followers deliberately causing an incident which would result in bloodshed. That the Mar Shimun is by no means averse to a number of Assyrians shedding their blood for him is proved by the fact that when the Bishop of Jerusalem begged him to write a note to Yaku telling him to come in, which note he, the Bishop, promised to deliver with his own hands, the Mar Shimun refused. Similarly his aunt Surma Khanum has been reported to have made many inflammatory remarks. This family is entirely indifferent to the sufferings of the rank and file providing that its own interests are served.

For the next day or two I do not think that there is much danger of anything happening. I hardly imagine that the Assyrians would be so mad as to make an unprovoked attack on a Government post. It is more probable, if they are not really thinking of emigrating, that they will let it be known that they have no intention of breaking up their concentration until Mar Shimun has returned to Mosul and his demands have been granted. In this event action will have to be taken. To-morrow morning the Commandant
of Police and the Inspecting Officer of Police are going out to Busirian to see the situation for themselves.

As for the conduct of Yaku and Luko this has been a grievous disappointment. They lied repeatedly to Major Thomson, who was doing his best to help them. It is clear that the Assyrians are not only stupid but untruthful.

NUMBER 66.

Inspecting Officer of Police, Mosul, to Administrative Inspector, Mosul,

In accordance with instructions I left Mosul at 3.45 A.M. on the 21st instant, and proceeded to Dohuk, where I met the Commandant of Police Wajih Beg, and the Mudir of the Deski, Lazar Effendi. Both these officials accompanied me on a tour of the Assyrian villages lying to the North and North East of Dohuk. The object was to verify the information contained in the Mutasarrif, Mosul, No. S/208 dated 20th July, 1933, to the Ministry of Interior.

1. SARASHOR. Only three old men in the village. Ora, the Rais, has left with all the young men. The people state they have no knowledge of the whereabouts of the men.

2. GIR-I-FIL. No young men about. The women report that the men have left and will not return, even if ordered by the Government. Refuse to say where the men have gone. Truculent.

3. BUSIRIAN. No young men present. The women did a lot of talking. Eventually Qas Elia arrived. We climbed the hills overlooking the village; there were a number of foot prints made by "kalashes", soled with the outer tyre of a motor car, but no traces of mules having been led on these tracks. On being questioned the Qas reported that he had heard that the men of Gorigavan, Kaolasan, Baroshki and Bagieira had arrived in the mountains, which lie to the east of the village, on the previous night. He had not seen them. He saw the men of Busirian leave with their arms and ammunition, as well as their mules and supplies. He further stated that they had gone in a westerly direction. We examined the mountain side with glasses, but could see no movement.

4. MARZUN (Kurdish village). A Kurd reported that on the previous evening he was at Gir-i-Fil he saw all the young men leave, complete with arms, ammunition, mules and supplies.

5. DARI (Kochanis). Only two old men, and 1 sick man. The women who did a lot of talking said that the Government had sent an order to the effect that the men should either give up their arms or go to another country. Therefore the men had left with the object of finding another home. The men at this village asked the Government to place a guard on the village, so as to protect them from thieves, etc. We explained that the Government had not told their men to leave, and that there had been no question of confiscating their arms. We advised them to send word to their men to return.

6. KHARABKOKLY (Kochanis). Three men left. These men did the talking and refused to allow the women to speak. They stated that their young men had left, with arms, ammunition and supplies, and had gone to the mountains, as they were frightened of being massacred, owing to the fact that the English had stated that they would not interfere in the administration of the Iraq Government in its dealings with the Assyrians; that they had heard that they would be disarmed.

7. MANSUR1YA (Kurds and Assyrians). On first arrival we questioned a small boy and a woman, both stated that the men had left village on the previous evening for Busirian. Soon after the Mukhtar Ishak Hanan arrived. He stated that no one had left, and he produced 7 men, three of whom had been in the Levies.

N.B.—There are 9 Assyrians houses in this village; Malik Shinko present. Both stated that they had no complaints against the Government, and that they were receiving fair treatment.
8. SIMEL. Mukhtar Warda with 40—50 men had left on the previous evening for the hills. They said that a message had been received from Dohuk to the effect that the Assyrians were concentrating in the hills, and that the men of Simel should join them.

N.B.—Rashid Bazi (from Syria 3 years ago) also went. This man’s sister is married to Officer Odishu of the Levies. Seven men of Baz also went. Zado s/o Malik Nato also went.

9. TEL KIS-HAF (Upper Tiyari—Assyrians and Yazidis). 16 houses of Assyrians. All the men had left. The reason given was that they had heard that the Government intended to disarm them, and that they had gone to look for a new home.

10. ZAWA (Kurdish village). Two Assyrian houses. Chief Sayid Yunis Ag-ha reported that for the past two nights the Assyrians from the undermentioned villages had passed by his village. On making enquiries for the reason for this movement, he was told that their leader, Yaku, had gone to the French in Syria, and that the Assyrians were collecting in readiness, on receipt of his orders, to move to Syria.

Villages: 
1. Assyrians from their villages in the Ain Sinf Qadha.
2. Assyrians from their villages in the Alqosh Nahiya.

OMARI.
ARTOK.
KERANA.
KUBERTO.
GARIFAN.
RIKABA.
DOSTAKA.
SALAHYAH.
KALA BADRAJ.
MASIKA.

Information will be received in the course of the next few days, as to the exact position of this concentration. This has been engineered from Baghdad and Mosul.

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NUMERO 67.

Extract from Qaim Qaimmaqam, Zakho’s telephone message No. S/30 dated 22nd July, 1933, to Mutasarrif, Mosul.

Qaimmaqam, Zakho reports that Yaku went to Syria on Monday last via Shailkiya and met the French Adviser at Ain Divar on Tuesday and on two other occasions afterwards. The French Adviser told Yaku to await the reply from headquarters.

Two mounted men and a car containing O.C. Kharab Rashk Post named Katrish of Badr Khan family came to the Assyrian encampment. Four Assyrians were also in the car. Yaku was there and assured his people that the French Government would accept them into Syria. Yaku threatened the informant against reporting that he had seen him in Syria, as Yaku stated the French Government had replied to the Iraq Government that he was not in Syria. Yaku and the others returned to Kharab Rashk post. At 11-30 another car containing the French Adviser of Ain Divar came to the Assyrian encampment and returned after half an hour.

About 150 Assyrians arrived at 12 noon at Faishkhabur ferry. They are mostly on foot and without families and have started crossing the river. Will report further developments.

Qaimmaqam ends asking what action should be taken in case French Government expel the Assyrians from Syria.
In confirmation of our verbal conversation of yesterday, I have the honour to inform you that I have lately been informed that a large party of Assyrians numbering about 1,300 men of the Tkhuma and Tiyari tribes who inhabit the Dohuk and Amadia Qadhas and other Assyrians crossed on 21st instant with their arms in the region of Faishkhabur and Shailkiya to Syrian territory, and that they are now established at Kaili Jali. Since these people belong to tribes which are not accustomed to migrate and since they entered Syrian territory without informing the Iraqi Government and obtaining its permission, as stipulated in Article 5 of the Provisional Agreement between Iraq and Syria for the regulation of the affairs of frontier tribes, I request that the Syrian authorities may be approached with a view to their taking necessary measures, in execution of Article 6 of the said Agreement, to disarm those Assyrians and to ensure that they shall stay in a district away from the frontier in order to prevent their committing any act contrary to law and order, and let me know the result.

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NUMBER 69.

Accord provisoire entre la Syrie et l'Iraq concernant le Règlement des Affaires des Tribus de la Frontière—Articles V and VI.

ARTICLE V.

Les tribus habituellement nomades ou semi-nomades pourront sans autorisation préalable transhumenter d'un territoire dans l'autre.

Les tribus qui ne transhumment pas habituellement devront pour s'établir temporairement ou définitivement sur le territoire voisin, obtenir du Gouvernement dont elles dépendent l'autorisation préalable de franchir la frontière.

Les deux Gouvernements s'interdisent toute pression à cet effet, ainsi que le droit de correspondre directement avec les chefs de tribus qui ne sont pas de leur obéissance, sauf le cas ou ces tribus sont stationnées sur leur territoire.

ARTICLE VI.

Toute tribu ou fraction de tribu ressortissant à l'un des deux états, qui passerait sur le territoire de l'état voisin sans autorisation préalable, si elle appartient aux catégories visées à l'article V, ou, si elle est en état de rebellion contre le Gouvernement dont elle relève, à quelque catégorie qu'elle appartienne, sera par les soins du Gouvernement sur le territoire duquel elle sera venue s'établir, désarmée dans la mesure du possible et maintenue à une distance telle de la frontière qu'elle ne puisse créer d'incidents dans le territoire de l'état qu'elle a abandonné.

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NUMBER 70.


In connexion with the recent movement of Assyrians across the Iraq frontier into Syrian territory for the purpose of emigration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been informed by the French Political Representative in Baghdad of the French Government's decision that Assyrians emigrating to Syrian territory are not to be accepted. Under the circumstances the Assyrian band will have to come back to Iraq. But, as you are aware and in view of the decision adopted by the Government, they cannot be allowed to cross into Iraq with their arms; they should be completely disarmed when crossing the frontier back to Iraq. As the Syrian Frontier Authorities have notified them of the decision not to accept them, they are expected to return to Iraq today. Owing to the great need for the presence
of a sufficient force at the points on the Iraq frontier by which they will be returning, in order to undertake the collection of their arms, you are requested to adopt the most urgent means possible for the dispatch of a force to that area to be ready to function immediately they return. Please treat the matter as very urgent.

NUMBER 71.

Ministry of Defence to Chief of the Staff, Baghdad, No. 879 dated 23rd July, 1933, (Translation).

In confirmation of our verbal conversation of this morning.

The Government policy towards the Assyrians is as follows:

1. Assyrians desirous of crossing from the left bank to the right bank of the Tigris to join their friends who have previously crossed the river are not be interfered with.

2. Any Assyrian desirous of crossing from the right bank to the left bank should not be allowed to do so, unless he surrenders his arms.

Please issue to the Military Authorities concerned clear instructions in this connection.

NUMBER 72.


Reference our Secret Memo. No. 879 dated 23rd July, 1933, and your No. S/1535 dated 22nd July, 1933.

1. It is understood from your memorandum referred to above that the duty of the forces concentrating east of the Tigris is to prevent the crossing of Assyrians who have emigrated to Syrian territory from the right bank to the left bank of the river, and to disarm them should they attempt to do so with their arms.

The question of disarmament requires the use of force, i.e. arms and fire. It is most probable that some of the Assyrians will be able to cross the river by swimming in places which are difficult to control by troops and proceed eastward back to their villages. If it happens that the troops come across some of these and ask them to surrender their arms, and they do not obey the order, it would then be the duty of those troops to disarm them by the use of force, that is to say, by opening fire.

Will you please confirm this clearly, to enable us to issue clear orders to the O.C. of the Force in this connection, as military action may demand.

2. On the other hand, you are requested to reconsider the question of allowing Assyrians wishing to leave Iraq and enter Syrian territory to join their comrades. To allow them to go armed passing through military areas and crossings controlled by military forces, would make them aware of the military arrangements and render the action in respect of those returning with their arms difficult. Therefore the only solution we find in this connection, holding to the contents of para 1 of our memo. No. 879 dated 23rd July, 1933, is to collect any of these wishing to cross to the right bank in a particular place and have then guided by the police to the crossings far from the military camps and the places where arrangements have been made opposite, any Assyrians infringing these arrangements to suffer the consequence.

NUMBER 73.


Reference the recent move of the Assyrians of the Tkhuma, upper Tiyari, a few of the Baz and Ashuti, to the right bank of the Tigris on the 21st and 22nd July.
1. I do not think there is much doubt that the leaders of the movement, are Yaku son of Malik Ismail and Luko of Tkhuma. The above two men together with Ishu Kalaita, Shamasha Ishkarin (Patti) and Shlimun brother of Yaku, have, since the conference held by the Mutasarrif, been in daily communication with Surma Khanum.

2. All arrangements for this move were carried out with absolute secrecy. All the Government knew was that the majority of the young and able bodied men had left their villages in the Amadia, Dohuk and Shaikh an Qadhas and had gone to the hills. On enquiries being made on Friday the 22nd instant, the only information that could be obtained, was that the men had left as they heard that the Iraq Government intended to disarm them. At the time of this enquiry, viz 6 a.m. to 1 p.m., all these men were on the move to the fords on the Tigris, viz Faishkhabur and Shailkiva. It was late afternoon before the report that they were crossing reached Liwa Headquarters.

3. Information is to hand that Yaku had visited Syria on three occasions prior to this move.

4. The total number (approximately) of Assyrians who have left for Syria amounts to 1500. A certain number of families have also crossed.

The leaders believed to be with this body, are Yaku, Luko, Shlimun Malik Ismail, Qas Yusuf of Tkhuma, Baithu Marcus of Tkhuma, and Malik Yokhanna Dinkha of Tkhuma.

5. The reports received at the time of writing (10 a.m. on 23rd July, 1933) are to the effect that ex-Levy Officer Yaku of the Ashuti tribe is on his way to Faishkhabur with a number of his men. He spent last night 22/23 July in the Sapna valley.

6. The Acting Mutasarrif has asked in his telegram No. S/210 of 22-7-33 for 1 Battalion of the 'Iraq Army and Column “A” of the Police Striking Force to hold the crossings at Faishkhabur and Shailkiah.

7. May I suggest that if the French Government refuse to entertain the Assyrians who have entered French Syria, a conference should then be held at the spot where they are encamped. It should be made quite clear to the Assyrians that as they are compelled to return to 'Iraq they as a result of their breach of faith, must forfeit their rifles and ammunition. The question of disarming these men will have to be dealt with very carefully as if an attempt to disarm them is made when they cross by the ferries and they resist, it will result in a severe loss of life, as the Assyrians will be caught at a disadvantage.

The main thing for the Government to arrange, is to split up this large body of men into small numbers, when they on seeing force majeure will submit to the inevitable, and surrender their rifles.

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NUMBER 74.

Administrative Inspector, Mosul, to Adviser, Ministry of Interior,
No. S/261 of 24th July, 1933, received on 26-7-33.

1. The Qaimmaqam of Amadia has informed me that Assyrians (presumably Ashuti) from Ser Amadia have on several occasions complained to him that a Levy Officer Eshu Yunan (Tkhuma tribes) and a Levy Sergeant Esha (Upper Tiyari tribe of Walko village) have been propagandizing to induce people to leave 'Iraq.

2. I have had several reports that a Levy Officer Odishu now stationed in Mosul has been among the most prominent of those engaged in anti-Government propaganda.

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NUMBER 75.

Ministry of Interior to Ministry of Defence No. S/1642
dated 25th July, 1933, (Translation).

Reference your No. 882 of 24th July, 1933.

The policy which the Government have decided to adopt in respect of
the Assyrians who emigrated to the Syrian territories is to prevent their return to 'Iraq until they have been disarmed. You are requested to instruct the Officer Commanding Troops concentrated east of the Tigris and all officers to use all possible wisdom to realise this end without resort to bloodshed which it is the desire of the Government to avoid; but if this end cannot be realised by peaceful means, there is no alternative to the use of force.

As regards the question of permitting Assyrians wishing to leave 'Iraq and enter Syrian territory, this Ministry considers the collection of all those Assyrians wishing to cross to the Faishkhabur area necessary, and we have instructed the authorities concerned to arrange accordingly.

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Number 76.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to the French Chargé d'Affaires, Baghdad, No. 6962 dated 27th July, 1933, (Translation).

I had the honour to point out to you in my note No. No. 6833 of 23rd July, 1933, that the Syrian authorities might be approached to take necessary steps, in accordance with Article 6 of the Provisional Agreement for the Regulation of Frontier Tribal Affairs concluded between 'Iraq and Syria, to disarm the Assyrians who took refuge in Syria and to ensure that they should stay in an area far away from the frontier in order to prevent them from disturbing order. But, I desire to bring to your notice that these Assyrians are still encamped on the right bank of the river Tigris opposite the 'Iraqi frontier, and that they have arranged fortified positions with the object of meeting the 'Iraqi forces by force in case the latter prevent their companions from crossing. If these refugees are not removed away from the frontier and disarmed, it may lead to bloodshed, and this the Iraqi Government does not wish to occur except in the last resort to ensure the maintenance of order. The failure of the Syrian authorities to execute the provisions of the above Agreement by removing them from the frontier and disarming them in spite of my request four days ago is contrary to the provisions of the said Agreement and the principles of Bon Voisinage. I therefore confirm and repeat my Government's above requests that urgent measures should be taken to remove these Assyrians from the frontier and to disarm them in accordance with the provisions of the said Agreement. I request you to let me know what action is taken in this matter.

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Number 77.


Result of the meeting of French and Iraqi representatives. Meeting was held at Khanik 18.15 hours to-day and adjourned 20.00 hours. Represented 'Iraq Makki Beg, Political Officer, Amad Force; Hamid Beg, Qaimmaqam Zakho; Lazar Staff Officer; and Lazar Ef. Assistant Political Officer; and on the French side Captain Lariste, Administrative Inspector, Euphrates Area and Adviser Ain Divar. Purport of French statement is that they are determined not to accept the Assyrians whether they remain armed or disarmed in Syrian territory; they promised officially on behalf of their Government that they would disarm them and drive them forcibly to 'Iraq territory after settlement of the frontier question (which is expected within three of four days) when they will be in Syrian territory. They denied that they were helping them with supplies but admitted that they have shops of Syrians, claiming that the people were free to deal in trade wherever they wished and they did not consider this act contrary to good neighbourly relations because the British Consul in Beirut asked the Syrian Government in the name of humanity to ensure their livelihood if they crossed to the right bank. After having explained the views of their Government they asked the intentions of 'Iraq Government and its object regarding those Assyrians and kept asking what the 'Iraq Government
would do. The Iraqi representatives replied that the Government intended not to accept their return to its country unless they surrendered their arms completely. If they did so they could return confidently to their villages, while the Iraq Government reserved the right to take legal action against the organizers of this movement; the moderation of 'Iraq was due to respect for frontier and the determination of 'Iraq Government not shed blood; it was quite easy to subdue them with the force stationed in Zakho area. Iraq representatives asked the French to promise not to accept any interview or meeting with their leaders as that encouraged them to mutiny and rebellion. They refused to give this promise, tried to prove that they only met certain chiefs and tribes to advise them to abandon this defiance.

NUMBER 78.

_Mutasarrif, Mosul to Commandant of Police, Mosul,_
_No. C/256 of 29-7-33. (Translation).

It is necessary, in the interests of public security and for the maintenance of the Government reputation abroad, to protect the Assyrian villages whose men have emigrated, from any aggression by greedy people.

If their unbalanced men went beyond the limits of reason and logic and disobeyed the laws of the country, they will, of course, be punished for such crimes according to the method to be prescribed by the Government.

Although I feel sure that my fellow officials are feeling the same feeling, I hereby only remind them of this, requesting you to draw the attention of O.C. patrols and station house officers to these points and to inform me as soon as possible of the arrangements which you will make.

NUMBER 79.

_Mutasarrif, Mosul to Ministry of Interior (Telegram—Translation)_
dated 29th July, 1933.

Following letter addressed to Qaimmaqams Dohuk and Zakho from the Inspector Euphrates Sanjak begins. From Capt. Laxiste, Inspector Euphrates Sanjak, to Qaimmaqam Zakho and Qaimmaqam Dohuk. I have the honour to request you to come at 10 a.m. on 29-7-33 to Christian Khanik village to enable me to meet you. I shall be at the place named at the hour fixed, should you have no objection. Please accept my distinguished respects. I shall also be pleased to meet Major Sargon the Inspecting Officer of Police Mosul ends. Please let us have your views regarding this meeting.

NUMBER 80.

_Amad Force to Interior Baghdad No. F. 6 of 31st July, 1933. (Telegram—Translation)._

Following telegram No. 12 dated 31st from Na'man begins. Confirm that Assyrians have surrendered their arms to French authority. They surrendered even their field glasses and their revolvers. Surrender took place at Bilisia, one mile north of Wadi Sufan. French Adviser counted the Assyrians and found them to be 1750 persons, also counted 470 animals including mules, donkeys, horses. Arms taken from Assyrians were transported by two lorries which were seen loaded by my informant. These reached Ain Divar in Syria. There remain only 200 persons at Wadi Sufan. They are about to move or perhaps moved on 30/7 evening to join the disarmed Assyrians. Remainder are waiting for 200 Assyrians to cross from the left to the right bank. They will surely cross from Makhulak ford at night with the assistance of Failashkur Christians by means of skin rafts specially built for them. Yaku bin Malik Ismail was with the 200 Assyrians waiting for Assyrians to cross by that ford. The disarmed Assyrians are now at Bilisia guarded by French troops.
Assyrians were supplied with 34 large tents for their abode by the French
My reporter saw 13 of these tents at Ala-Labra, 13 at Masakerik and
8 at Dairik. Turks have forces on the frontier at Jazirat bin 'Umar
Slwaiwatiya and Daurban, preventing the arrival there of Assyrians.

NUMBER 81.

No. 123.

Le Chargé d’Affaires de France en présentant ses compliments au
Département des Affaires Etrangères à l’honneur d’accuser réception de ses
lettres No. 6533 et 6962 des 23 et 27 Juillet courant concernant le passage
dans les territoires sous Mandat Français d’un groupe important d’Assyriens
en armes.

Les suggestions proposées à ce propos par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté
le Roi ont été immédiatement transmises au Haut Commissariat de la Ré­
publique à Beyrouth et au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères à Paris.

Le Chargé d’Affaires de France saisit cette occasion pour renouveler au
Département des Affaires Etrangères Irakien les assurances de sa haute et
amicale considération.

Bagdad, le 29 Juillet 1933.

(Seaux).

NUMBER 82.

Administrative Inspector, Mosul to Adviser, Ministry of Interior,
No. S/276 of 30th July, 1933 received on 1st August, 1933.

I would again emphasise the necessity for the early removal from Mosul
of a number of Assyrians who are most active in anti-Government propa­
ganda. This propaganda mainly takes the form of (1) encouraging still
more Assyrians to go over into Syria (2) encouraging those who have crossed
the river to remain there by statements (a) that the French official announce­
ments are false and that the French authorities are going to accept them in
Syria (b) that the French are feeding the Assyrians and helping them in
other ways. This propaganda apart from inducing the misguided Assyrians
to continue in their foolish ways, is having the result of inflaming local
opinion against the French authorities—and this without reason.

There is no doubt that this propaganda emanates from the house of the
Mar Shinun in Mosul. There is certainly daily communication between
them and the fugitive Assyrians.

NUMBER 84.

Statement issued by the Iraq Government on 1st August, 1933.
(Translation).

It is recognised that the Iraq Government has given all possible assis­tance
to the Assyrians to enable them to settle on the land and generally to
improve their condition. The Government has done this in the hope that the
Assyrians would become loyal subjects of Iraq and honour the obligations
which rest on all Iraqis. With this end in view the Government excused
them the payment of taxation, helped them to settle in a number of villages
in Northern Iraq, and helped them financially when it was found that such
assistance was necessary.

There is not the slightest doubt that the Government, for its part, has
carried out the obligations it undertook before the League of Nations. In
proof of this statement the recent appointment of a specialist to supervise
the settlement of the Assyrians may be cited. A large sum of money has
been set aside in the Iraq Budget to cover the expenses of the settlement.
Notwithstanding all the efforts of the Iraq Government, the Assyrian leader, Mar Shimun, raised difficulties to obstruct the carrying out of the Government’s policy. He has put forward demands which were not only unreasonable but which were against the law of the land and not in accordance with the recommendations of the League of Nations. One of his demands was that he should have temporal authority which could not be revoked.

The Government came to the conclusion that the presence of Mar Shimun in Mosul would retard the peaceful settlement of the Assyrians, and therefore ordered him to come to Baghdad. When he arrived he was informed that he would not be allowed to return to Mosul until he gave a guarantee that he would keep the peace and refrain from doing anything which would hinder the work of peaceful settlement. He was told that he must also refrain from putting forward other unreasonable demands. Mar Shimun refused to give the guarantees required by the Government, whereupon he was ordered to stay in Baghdad.

Unfortunately the trouble did not end there. Some armed followers tried to disturb the peace by assembling together and refusing to obey the orders of the authorities. They also threatened other Assyrians who were friendly to the Government. The chief of these hostile Assyrians is a man named Yaku Ismail. Eventually the Government had no alternative but to despatch a punitive force against these men. They were compelled to submit to the Government’s terms, and they promised to make no attempt in future to disturb the peace.

The Government then thought it advisable to call a meeting of the Assyrians leaders which was held in the office of the Mutasarrif of Mosul. At this meeting a declaration of the Government’s policy was made in the presence of the Settlement Officer. The Assyrians once more gave an undertaking that they would cooperate with the Government in the Preservation of law and order.

On yet another occasion, however, the followers of Mar Shimun tried to disturb the peace. They assembled, fully armed near the mountain of Busirian. When they found that the Government had not been caught unawares, and that the Government’s forces were sufficiently powerful to crush any unlawful movement, the party of Assyrians crossed the frontier into Syria. They numbered 1,350 armed men.

In view of the fact that their action was unlawful, and that it had been carried out without the Government’s knowledge or sanction, the Government decided these men should not be allowed to return to Iraq unless they first surrendered their arms. The Government’s view that the disarming of these men would safeguard the peace, and would be an example to others who might be contemplating unlawful action.

In order to enforce its decision the Government despatched a sufficient force, military and police, to various points along the Syrian frontier. When some of the Assyrians tried to re-enter Iraq in the neighbourhood of Faishkhabur they were disarmed by detachments of the Iraq Army. Others tried to cross the frontier into Iraq and retain their arms. They were warned that they must surrender their weapons but refused to do so and offered some armed resistance to the Iraq Army, which was obliged to retaliate. The Assyrians were then compelled to withdraw.

The Iraq Government then communicated with the French Chargé d’Affaires in Baghdad, asking him to approach his Government with a request that they should carry out the provisions of the Treaty of Bon Voisinage between Iraq and Syria. According to the provisions of this treaty it was the duty of the Syrian authorities to disarm the Assyrians and insist on their withdrawing from the frontier. The French authorities in Syria acted in accordance with the request made by the Iraq Government.

This happy ending was reached only with the help of God and the cooperation of the Iraqi nation. The Government is still ready to meet all exigencies, and is prepared to take firm steps, in the interests of the whole country, against any section of the community which may be contemplating an attempt to disturb the peace.
Esiwa Bazi and Yaku Ashuti, Assyrians, approached Qaimmaqam Zakho through Faishkhabur asking to be allowed to return to 'Iraq together with sixty of their followers. Qaimmaqam Zakho asked me for instructions and I replied that he should accept them on condition they surrender their arms, then take undertakings to preserve the peace and allow them to go to their villages.

In reply to your C/1622 following is the result submitted by Makki Eff. He and the French Colonel declared to the Assyrians in the name of the French High Commissioner that they will not be accepted into Syria. He does not know how far the disarmed persons will remain in Syrian territory and he will not accept their families. He confirmed that the French policy was to return them all to 'Iraq. He evaded many questions and gave no reply to some others. We requested him that the 'Iraq Government should be informed before a sufficient period if it is intended to return arms to the Assyrians and he took note of this request. He stated that he will never allow the others to enter Syrian territory. He pointed out that the entering of the 415 persons was done without his knowledge. He said that he now respects the old frontier until he receives the order regarding the putting in force of the new. He dealt with the incident of the armed ears as a trivial one to which he attaches no importance. Discussions were outwardly conducted in a very friendly manner and despite this Captain Lariste was very indefinite.

Following received from Qaimmaqam Zakho at 20.20 hrs., begins. Assistant Commandant Police Faishkhabur reports that Assyrians in Syria crossed with their arms to 'Iraq territory by fords near Suffan-Tigris confluence and were challenged by picquets on high ground commanding fords of Tigris and Kubur at 18.45 hrs. First picquet of four all wounded. Army in action and engagement continues. Assistant Commandant reports statement of wounded man that strength of Assyrians is uncertain but obviously great. It is stated that French returned to them rifles previously taken.
NUMBER 88.

Amad Force to Ministry of Defence, Baghdad No. 173 of 5th August, 1933,
(Telegram—Translation).

The Assyrians have attacked the military camp situated at the end of Bikhair mountain. The attack still continues. Addressed Defence Baghdad repeated Mosul garrison, Defence, Mosul, Amin column and Interior, Baghdad.

NUMBER 89.

Administrative Inspector, Mosul, to Adviser, Ministry of Interior, No. S/291 dated 7th August, 1933, (Received 9th August, 1933).

On the afternoon of August 4th, the French gave back their arms to the Assyrians previously disarmed. What makes this action even more blame-worthy is that (1) the Iraqi Political Officer in the course of the meeting with Captain Lariste on August 2nd, particularly requested that if it was the intention of the French authorities to return the rifles, they should first inform the Iraqi authorities. Captain Lariste noted this request in his pocket book, (2) About 2 p.m. on the afternoon of August 4th, Lazar Eff. (Mudir of Dohuk) who was acting as Assistant Political Officer crossed over to Khanik, as the French were taking over the police post. He met a French officer there. This officer said nothing whatever about the return of the rifles to the Assyrians. It is of course, possible that the blame for the extraordinary conduct of the French authorities must be entirely attached to the local French Officers. The superior authorities may have ordered the return of the rifles and the immediate expulsion of the Assyrians, which orders were carried out at once by local authorities, who must have known full well what the result would be.

2. I have seen Makki Beg the Political Officer and Lazar Eff. the Assistant Political Officer and from their accounts and from other reports which I have received I have been able to obtain some idea of what happened on the evening and night of August 4th.

Naturally much still remains obscure but the following is at least a rough outline:

(a) As noted above Lazar Eff. was in Khanik Police Post at 2 p.m. While he was there Werda, Mukhtar of Simel village, spoke to him and said that a number of Assyrians wished to return to Iraq. Lazar Eff. told him that they could do so but would have to return their rifles. Werda said that he understood that.

(b) At about 5 p.m. the French authorities brought down two lorries to the head of Wadi Suffan. These lorries were full of Assyrian rifles, which were given to their owners. The Assyrians were then told to leave Syrian territory at once.

(c) At about 6 p.m. Aziz Agha, Mukhtar of Faishkhabur village, telephoned to the Political Officer at Dairabun camp saying that Assyrians were crossing the river about 500 yards above Faishkhabur. The Political Officer instructed him to send some of his people (Aziz Agha is a Chaldean Christian) to tell the Assyrians that they must surrender their rifles if they came into Iraq.

(d) On receipt of the above news the G.O.C. troops sent a company to meet the Assyrians. It appears to have been thought that these Assyrians intended surrendering their rifles. Verbal orders were given to the officer commanding the company, (1) not to open fire unless fired on, (2) to avoid firing shots which would drop in Syrian territory.

This company proceeded to meet the Assyrians until they were fired at without warning. One of the first shots killed one of the officers.
Comment.—There is reason to think that at least a part of the Assyrians did intend to surrender. Certain of the leaders were determined to prevent this at all costs. It is stated that Yaku was one of the first to cross the river and that it was he who was the first to open fire on the ‘Iraq Army troops.

Number 90.
No. 133.

Le Chargé d’Affaires de France en Irak en présentant ses compliments au Département des Affaires Etrangères à Bagdad à l’honneur de Lui accuser réception de sa lettre No. 7326 du 6 Août courant concernant les Assyriens revenus de Syrie en Irak avec leurs armes et de l’avisir que les Autorités Mandataires françaises au Levant ainsi que le Département des Affaires Etrangères à Paris ont été immédiatement informés par le télégraphe de cette nouvelle protestation du Gouvernement de sa Majesté le Roi dont la traduction en Français a été également transmise par la Poste.

Le Chargé d’Affaires de France, en présentant ses regrets pour cet incident pénible, se fera un devoir de communiquer les explications que les Hautes Authorities françaises ne manqueront pas de fournir à ce propos.

Pour répondre à une controverse soulevée au sujet de cette question, il croit opportun également de confirmer au Département des Affaires Etrangères ses nombreuses démarches verbales l’assurant que toute les précédentes communications du Gouvernement de Bagdad concernant les Assyriens ont été transmises sur l’heure par le télégraphe à Beyrouth et à Paris et que ce poste n’a jamais été en mesure de prévenir en temps utile les Autorités Irakiennes de l’armement des fugitifs et de leur retour en Irak.

Il saisit très volontiers cette occasion de présenter au Département des Affaires Etrangères les assurances de sa très haute considération.

Bagdad, le 8 Août 1933.

(Seeaux).